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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is mainly concerned with the question whether 
'conventional' economic theory - especially the neoclassical 
theory of general equil ibrium - is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the particular conditions prevailing in the develop-
ing countries. It is argued that most existing theories of 
economic underdevelopment adopt an interpretative approach 
which essentially amounts to relaxing some of the chief 
assumptions of the neoclassical theory. When applied to the 
two-sector model of general equilibrium, these theories generally 
yield predictions which are vastly different from those associa-
ted with the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition, 
unlimited factor substitutability and unrestricted resource 
mobil ity. 
Several theories seek to explain the development problem 
in terms of the specific production processes used in poor 
countries. Myrdal's (1957) theory of cumulative causation, 
for example, effectively introduces increasing returns to 
scale in at least one sector or region of the economy; in 
contrast to the neoclassical theory, he thus envisages a 
cumulative process of regional divergence in the output 
level per worker. Similarly, Richard Eckaus's (1955) 
explanation of the "f actor-proportions problem" is based 
on the assumption of limited factor substitutability. This 
enables him to establi sh the existence of a so-called "unemploy-
ment equi I ibrium", thus implying that developing countries may 
( vi) 
be faced with a conflict between the objective of maximizing 
social -welfare on the one hand, and that of full employment on 
the other. More recently, Leibenstein (1960) has shown that 
(vii ) 
this trade-off may be complicated by the introduction of capital-
biased technological inventions and innovations. The solution 
to the factor-proportions problem consists in the adoption of 
more appropriate, usually labour-biased technologies, increased 
capital formation and a reduction in the rate of population 
growth. 
Much of the postwar literature on economic development 
has focused on the imperfectly competitive structure of the 
product and the factor markets in developing countries. Myint 
(1954) has highlighted the role played by monopolies and 
01 igopol ies during the "opening-up" process of economic 
development. Likewise, both Lewis's (1954) dualist theory 
and Todaro's (1969; 1971) model of rural-urban migration 
attempt to explain the unemployment problem in terms of 
various factor price distortions. In an international 
context, Prebisch (1950; 1959) and Singer (1950) have again 
shown how prevailing differences in the structure of markets 
between developed and developing countries may turn the terms 
of trade against the latter; using a two-sector model, 
Bhagwati (1958) has demonstrated that such a deterioration 
in the terms of trade could bring about a net decrease in 
the welfare level of the countries concerned. Generally, the 
pol icy measures relevant to the "market imperfections" problem 
include the creation of job opportunities in the rural (rather 
than urban) sector, the encouragement of informal-sector 
enterprises,and the imposition of factor taxes and subsidies 
as a means of counteracting the adverse effect of factor price 
distortions on employment . 
A more recent approach to the unemployment problem is the 
plea by the International Labor Office (1970; 1972) for a 
redistribution of income within the developing countries. In 
terms of the two-sector model, such a policy may well succeed 
in eliminating labour unemployment caused by fixed factor 
proportions and/or factor pric~ distortions. It should be 
realized, though, that a redistribution of income may lower 
the aggregate savings level, and hence also the growth rates 
of capital and labour employment in the economy. 
(viii) 
On the whole, it would seem that these theories do indeed 
adopt a modified version of the neoclassical theory in providing 
a fairly comprehensive explanation of the economic problems of 
labour unemployment , low incomes and inequality. 
INTRODUCTION 
"The major inadequacies of 
conventional economies are 
that the analysis 
focuses on the wrong fac-
tors, and the models do 
not fit at all closely the 
way in which non-industrial 
economies operate". 
D. Seers (1963, p. 83) 
"Over a wide range the 
relevance of economic 
analysis to poor countries 
is not in question, since 
some of the propositions 
of economics derive directly 
from the universal limita-
tion of resources" . 
P.T. Bauer (1963, p. 360) 
The views expressed in the above quotations are characteristic 
of two distinct schools in the field of development economics. On 
the one hand it is argued that economic theory in the 'conventional' 
1. 
sense is wholly or largely irrelevant to the problem of underdevelop-
ment. Adherents to this view contend that received micro- and 
macroeconomic theory should either be changed extensively, or 
abandoned completely and replaced by a theoretical structure 
whose domain extends beyond the realm of the "economic", and 
whose methodology and basic premises would be more appropriate 
to actual conditions prevailing in the poor countries. Opposing 
views hold that conventional economic theory is either quite 
relevant to developed and developing countries alike, or that 
it could be made more applicable simply by modifying some of 
its assumptions. 
According to Myrdal (1968; 1970; 1973), Seers (1963; 1971; 
1971-72), Szentes (1976) and others,1 the irrelevance of economic 
1 . See, for example, Sweezy (1970), Streeton (1972, ch. 5) and 
Lipton (1977, ch. 4). 
theory derives from the fact that its assumptions are ·generally 
drawn from the special conditions existing in the industrially 
advanced countries. Most economists are insufficiently trained 
to recognize, let alone analyze, the social and political factors 
determining economic progress in the developing countries. While 
such an "omission" may be permissible in the context of the 
advanced economies, the relative importance of these "non-economic" 
variables in developing countries renders a purely economic 
approach largely meaningless. Myrdal (1973) and Seers (1963) in 
particular question the methodology and "realism" embodied in 
several theoretical approaches to the study of economic under-
development, such as the neoclassical theory of resource alloca-
tion , Keynes's multiplier principle,growth and "stages of growth" 
theories developed by Harrod' (1939), Domar (1946) and Rostow (1956; 
1960). These theories are said to rely on patently unrealistic 
assumptions and generally fail to come to grips with the 
essentially dynamic task of promoting economic development in 
poor countries . In brief, adopting the conventional approach 
introduces a methodological and ideological bias which tends 
to "distort and prejudice our view into a particular direction".2 
Although few economists would deny that these criticisms are 
at least partly justified, most would agree that they hardly 
constitute an argument for the abondoning of received economic 
theory. Apart from the difficulties involved in defining and 
quantifying such "non-economic" variables as " the social 
2. Myrdal (1973, p. 89). 
2. 
structure ·, political forces, attitudesand institutions",3 their 
incorporation into models designed to explain development problems 
is likely to produce excessively complex propositions and policy 
prescriptions. Moreover, it seems premature to advocate the 
abandonment of conventional economic theory without first 
establishing whether the existing theories could be modified in 
such a way as to accommodate the various criticisms listed above. 
In a similar vein, Myint (1967) has argued that the static theory 
3. 
of resource allocation associated with the neoclassical school may 
well assume greater significance in the context of a more compre-
hensive, dynamic approach to the study of economic underdevelopment. 
This is because the growth potential of a country, whether it is 
developed or developing, depends at least partly on whether it is 
able to utilize its given resources in a socially efficient way: 
"a country's absorptive capacity must to a large extent depend 
on its ·ability to avoid serious misallocation of resources".4 
Myint (1954; 1967), Bauer (1963; 1971) and others 5 maintain 
that existing economic theory is sufficiently adaptable to fit the 
particular conditions of the developing countries. This proposi-
tion is similar to what Chenery (1975, p. 310) once called the 
"structuralist approach", according to which an attempt is made 
to "identify specific rigidities, lags and other characteristics 
of the structure of developing countries that affect economic 
adjustments and the choice of development policy". Although 
3. Myrdal (1973, p. 100). 
4. Myint (1967, p. 124) 
5. See Schultze (1973) and Chenery (1975). 
elements of "structural ism" are present in several postwar 
investigations into problems of development - including Myrdal's 
(1957) notion of cumulative causation, Lewis's (1954) labour-
surplus economy, Prebisch's (1950; 1959) study of the inter-
national terms of trade, and recent work on the urban informal 
sector - it seems rather odd that many of these analyses have 
been viewed as representing a "radically new" or "revolutionary" 
approach to the study of economic underdevelopment.6 The fact 
of the matter would seem that most "structuralists" usually 
employ conventional tools of economic analysis which can be 
easily fitted into a classical, neoclassical or Keynesian 
theoretical framework;7 far from breaking down conventional 
economics, the structuralist approach may yet be seen one day 
as having reinforced and enriched the existing body of economic 
theory. 
It is within this general context that Myint (1967, p. 117) 
has stressed the need for " .... a general practitioner to act as 
a middleman between different specialized fields of development 
economics and also between development economics and general 
economics His aim should be to try to apply the existing 
economic theory in a more realistic and fruitful way to suit the 
varying conditions of different types of underdeveloped country". 
4. 
6 . See Kay's (1975) and Leys's (1977) criticisms of the dependency 
thesis. 
7. One is reminded of Kay's (1975, p. 104) scathing remark that 
the dependency thesis " .... is an eclectic combination of orthodox 
economic theory and revolutionary phraseology". 
5. 
What, then, should be the task of such a "general practitioner"? 
Should he try to integrate the various 'structuralist hypotheses' 
into a general theory of economic underdevelopment? Or should he 
adopt a partial approach in which the distinct characteristics of 
the developing economies are analyzed independently within a 
suitably modified variant of one or more of the existing theories? 
The answer to such a question may lie in the fact that the size 
and nature of the development problem tend to vary greatly within 
and between different developing countries. Such diversity 
severely limits the number of generalizations that can be 
effectively applied to all developing countries at the same 
time. Even if it were possible to construct a 'general' theory 
of development, its inevitably complex structure is likely to 
yield predictions of very limited practical value; in Friedman's 
(1966, p. 14) words, such a 'general' theory would explain 
"little by much". 
The most appropriate course of action would seem to be the 
development of "partial" theories as a means of analysing 
specific economic problems common to most or ideally all develop-
ing countries. In this context it is worth noting Leibenstein's 
(1966) suggestion that the "efficiency" of the partial approach 
depends i nter a~ia on whether it can be applied within a 
suitable "analytical framework". The aim of such a framework 
should be to simplify and reduce the multitude of real-world 
observations to "a small enough bundle of general concepts that 
they may be discussed efficient~y"; it should be looked upon as 
" .... the mold out of which specific types of theories are ~ade".8 
8. Le i bens t ei n (1966, pp. 3 and 7 ) . 
One of the most useful of such existing frameworks is arguably 
represented by the neoclassical theory of general equilibrium. 
This view is not necessarily based on a belief that the under-
lying assumptions of the theory are in any sense "realistic", 
or that its behavioural relationships are always capable of 
yielding accurate predictions. 9 Rather, the usefulness of 
general equilibrium theory derives from its capacity to 
acoamndate a large variety of alternative assumptions. It is 
this built-in flexibility that enables the theory to yield 
alternative predictions applicable to many different real-
world situations. 
Generally, there can be little doubt that economic conditions 
in the developing countries do differ vastly from those prevailing 
in the industrially advanced countries. What is at stake is the 
question whether conventional economic theory - especially the 
neoclassical theory of general equilibrium - could be adapted in 
such a way as to allow for the particular conditions of the 
developing countries. It is with this question that the present 
thesis is mainly concerned. We begin with an introductory chapter 
on the neoclassical theory of general equilibrium. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to provide an appropriate analytical 
framework within which the various "partial" theories of 
underdevelopment may be subsequently discussed in a meaningful 
way. While the two-sector model of general equilibrium will be 
used throughout the thesis, chapters 2 to 5 attempt to show that 
existing theories have in common an analytical approach which 
9. The theory does not, of course, lay claim to any such 
properties. (See Kaldor (1972, pp. 1237-1238); Friedman (1966». 
6. 
7. 
essentially amounts to relaxing some of the chief assumptions of 
the neoclassical theory. Specifically, Chapter 2 considers several 
theories which seek to explain the development problem in terms of 
particular production processes in the poor countries: for example, 
while Myrdal's (1957) theory of cumulative causation effectively 
introduces differential returns to scale into the two-sector 
model, Richard Eckaus's (1955) analysis of the "factor-proportions 
problem" is again based on the "alternative" assumption of limited 
factor substitutability. Likewise, Leibenstein (1960) has shown 
that the factor-proportions problem may be aggravated by the 
introduction of inappropriate technological inventions and 
innovations. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are both concerned with the fact that the 
product and factor markets in most developing countries are 
generally characterized by imperfect competition. Chapter 3 
discusses Myint's (1954) view of the role played by foreign-
owned mono po I ies during the so-ca lied "open ing-up" stage of 
economic development . Also, an attempt is made to place Lewis's 
(1954) dualist theory, Todaro's (1969, 1971) model of rural-urban 
migration and the phenomenon of the urban informal sector within 
the general context of factor market imperfections. Chapter 4 
examines the effect of various price distortions on the static 
and dynamic gains derived from international trade . In particular, 
the chapter considers Prebisch's (1950, 1959) and Singer's (1950) 
contention that the differences in market structure between 
developed and developing countries have turned the terms of trade 
against the latter. This is followed by an assessment of the 
. relative efficacy of tariff protection and domestic taxes and 
subsidies in eliminating international trade disequilibria 
arising from the existence of domestic price distortions. 
Chapter 5 considers the recent debate on the employment 
potential associated with a policy of income redistribution in 
favour of low-income groups within the developing countries. 
It is shown there, that while such a policy may well give rise 
to a net increase in labour employment in the short run, this 
is likely to be eventually offset by changes in individual 
8. 
tastes resulting from a so-called demonstration effect. Similarly, 
available evidence indicates that a redistribution of income may 
cause a decrease in the aggregate savings level, and hence also 
in the growth rates of capital, employment and output. The thesis 
concludes with a brief summary of its main findings and relevant 
policy implications. 
9. 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT : 
A NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH 
Although there are good reasons why the ceteris paribus assumption 
has been widely used in both micro- and macroeconomic analysis, this 
should not cloud the fact that, if carried too far, "holding other 
things constant" may yield inadequate, if not misleading, results. 
In the field of growth economics, for example, the predictive value 
of the Harrod-Domar and neoclassical models is limited by their sole 
reliance on demand and supply factors, respective1y. Similarly, 
international trade theorists have either ignored demand factors 
altogether or, at least, impounded them in a ceteris paribus assump-
tion . Likewise, it is probably fair to say that the economist's 
rather belated "discovery" of the stagflation phenomenon is due in 
part to his having neglected changing supply conditions ; and indeed, 
only time wi II tell whether the recent "supply-side" economics may 
prove to be similarly constrained. However useful the ceteris paribus 
assumption may be, tr.ere can be no doubt that its painstaking 
application in economic analysis has hardly done justice to those 
who cr~ated and perfected the "general cases" in the first place. 
In the field of development economics the same criticism seems 
to apply only to a relatively limited extent; in point of fact, the 
failings and frailties of development economics partly stem from an 
unwillingness or inability to hypothesize on the basis of ceteris 
paribus. Most "theories" of economic underdevelopment either take 
too narrow a view of the problem at hand, or merely recount real 
world complexities in a rather equivocal and often haphazard manner. 
To the former category belong inter a~ia several growth models' and 
strategies,2 demographic studies3 and dualist theories of economic 
development. 4 Other writers have again tried to account for too 
many variables at once, thus limiting the testability and general 
'0. 
predictability of their respective analyses: it is perhaps paradoxical 
that none of the recent "interpretations",5 "dramas",6 "non-communist 
manifesto ,,7 and "crises,,8 have even come close to providing a 
comprehensive and generally valid explanation of economic under-
development. While it cannot be denied that these studies have 
provided useful insights into the nature of the development problem 
itself, it seems nevertheless either premature to claim discovery of 
a "main hypothesis ... a vision of the general theory which we are all 
yearning for,,,9 or it may be simply futile to even "yearn" for such 
a theory. 
In the remainder of this thesis we shall attempt to steer a 
middle course by adopting a simplified version of the Walrasian theory 
of general economic equilibrium. Specifically, our analysis will be 
limited to the familiar two-sector model, in which two consumers are 
1. Bruton (1955), Chenery and Bruno (1962), Mahalanobis (1955), 
Raj and Sen (1961), Pesek (19611, Qayum (1964), Schatz (1968) and 
Maddison (1970). For reviews and criticisms of the literature, see 
Singh (1966, Ch.2), Williamson (1968) and Reddaway (1962, app. C). 
2. We refer to 
Rosenstein-Radan 
Streeten (1959), 
the literature on balanced versus unbalanced growth: 
(1943), Hirschman (1958), Scitovsky (1954 and 1959), 
Nurske (1953) and Lewis (1955) . 
3. Nelson (1956), Neher (1971, Ch.4), Coale and Hoover (1958), Coale 
(1963) and Enke (1967). 
4. Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1961 and 1964), Jorgenson (1961) and 
Kelly et a~ (1972) . 
5. Myint (1954). 
6. Myrdal (1968). 
7. Ros tow (1960). 
8. Dos Santos (1973), 
9. Myrdal (1957, pp . 23 and 13). 
assumed to supply two production factors to firms producing two 
commodities for final demand purposes;'O it is perhaps worth noting 
too that the symbols X and Y will be used alternately to denote 
commodities, firms, sectors and regions. Although the two-sector 
model is not without its shortcomings, it does at least allow one 
to consider supply and demand conditions simultaneously, both from 
a static and a dynamic perspective. Similarly, it is generally agreed 
that the chief conclusions of the two-sector model are valid also for 
an economy containing several consumption goods and capital goods 
sectors." 
This chapter falls into six parts: section 1 provides a brief 
summary of the basic assumptions underlying the two-sector model, 
which are then used in section 2 to derive the various conditions 
necessary to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources; 
section 3 introduces appropriate exogenous changes into the two-
sector model, in an attempt to explain the emergence of economic 
underdevelopment from a purely neoclassical perspective; sections 
4 and 5 discuss the comparative static and dynamic adjustment 
mechanisms operating under conditions of perfect competition; and 
finally, section 6 assesses the extent to which the chief assumptions 
,1. 
of the theory approximate real-world conditions in developing countries. 
10. See, for example, Johnson (1971), Krauss and Johnson (1974) 
Simpson (1975) and Baldry (1980) . 
11. Note, for example, Meade's (1961, p. x) admittedly cautious 
view: " . . . I have a strong hunch that the main result would be not 
very substantially to alter the basic conclusions of the present 
(two-sector) analysis, but very greatly to increase the possibility 
of substitution between the various factors of production". 
1. The Two-sector Model of General Equilibrium: Basic Assumptions. 
To begin with. it seems worth giving a brief account of the 
basic assumptions of the two-sector model. especially since many 
of these will be subsequently relaxed in the chapters to follow. 
The most important ones are listed below: 
(i) There are two production factors. capital (K) and labour (L) 
both of which are infinitely divisible and owned by two 
individual consumers. A and B. The total supply of K and L 
as well as its distribution among A and B are exogenously 
determined. 
(ii) Each consumer derives satisfaction or 'utility' from consuming 
two substitutable commodities. X and Y. Consumer tastes are 
determined independently and exogenously. which rules out 
external economies and diseconomies in consumption. Prefer-
ences are transitive while each consumer is assumed to prefer 
more of both goods. These assumptions imply that consumer 
preferences may be represented by a series of indifference 
curves that are continuous. non-intersecting and convex to 
the origin . 
(iii) Each commodity is produced by one firm only. Although the 
two production functions are non-identical. both are charac-
terized by unlimited factor substitutability and diminishing 
marginal productivities. thus giving rise to smooth isoquants 
that are convex to the origin. The further assumption that 
each production function is also subject to constant returns 
to scale. rules out internal and external (dis)economies in 
production. 
12. 
(iv) The sole objective of each consumer and firm is maximization 
of utility and profit, respectively. 
(v) Both the factor markets and the commodity markets are 
perfectly competitive, which implies the familiar assumptions 
of homogeneity, perfect knowledge and the presence of large 
numbers of small-sized buyers and sellers; in addition, we 
assume that all resources are completely mobile, both in the 
occupational and spatial sense of the word. 
(vi) There exists a social welfare of the form 
W = W (Ua , Ub) 
where W represents the level of social welfare, and U
a 
and 
Ub are the utility levels of A and B respectively. Since 
the chief characteristics of the social welfare function are 
discussed in Appendix 1, suffice it to mention here that it 
presupposes an ethical valuation of the relative worthiness 
of A and B. 
We might finally note that assumptions (ii) to (v) ensure that 
a general equilibrium does in fact exist. 12 Similarly, if we rule 
out the possible existence of an upward-sloping demand curve, then 
13 . 
( 1.1) 
it can be shown that the same assumptions also guarantee the existence 
of a stable and unique eqUilibrium. 13 
12. Arrow and Debreu (1954). 
13. See Weintraub (1974) and Simpson (1975). 
2. Static Equilibrium: Welfare Maximization and Pareto Optimality. 
The welfare function introduced in the previous section may be 
viewed as the overall objective of society, which needs to be 
maximized subject to a set of given constraints. These constraints 
consist of (i) the fixed endowments of K and L; (ii) the tastes 
of A and B which are represented here by the respective individual 
utility functions; and (iii) the state of the technology as indicated 
by the production functions for X and Y. The maximization problem may 
thus be formulated as fOllows :14 
Maximize W = W (Ua, Ub) 
subject to Ua = Ua (Q~, Qb) Y 
Ub = 
b Qb) Ub (Qx' y 
a b Q
x 
Q
x (Kx' Lx) Qx + Qx = = 
a b Qy Qy (Ky ' Ly) Qy + Qy = = 
and K = K x + Ky 
L = Lx + Ly 
where O~, Q~ and Q~, Q~ are the quantities of X and Y consumed 
by A and B respectively; Kx' Lx and Ky ' Ly are the quantities of 
K and L used in the production of X and Y,respectively; and K and 
L are the respective endoWIToents of K and L. 
14. Similar procedures are followed by Layard and Walters (1978, 
ch . 1) and Henderson and Quandt (1971, ch.4) . 
14. 
(1. 1 ) 
(1. 2) 
(1.3) 
( 1.4) 
The solution to this maximization problem is derived fully 
in Appendix 2. It is worth noting here, however, that the solution 
entails all the familiar conditions for a Pareto-optimal allocation 
of resources. These are. reproduced below: 
(i) The first condition refers to production efficiency in 
the economy as a whole; or 
= w/r = 
where wand r are the prices of labour and capital respectively. 
Condition (1 .5) represents equality between the marginal rates of 
technical substitution of L for K in the production of X and Y, 
respectively; or 
x MRTS 1,k = MRTS Y 1,k 
This condition may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1.1. The 
dimensions of the box diagram shown in Figure 1.1(a) are determined 
by the given supplies of K and L: the vertical axes depict units 
of K and the horizontal axes units of L, while Ox and 0y are the 
origins for commodities X and Y respectively. The contract curve, 
Ox 0y' represents the locus of input ratios for which the respective 
marginal rates of technical substitution are equal; that is, each 
pOint along Ox 0y designates the maximum attainable quantity of one 
commodity, given the quantity of the other. Consequently, since 
each input ratio along Ox 0y corresponds to a unique output 
conbinaticn along the production poss ibi Ii ty or transformation curve, 
T T' in Figure 1.1(b), it follows that equality between the 
individual marginal rates of technical substitution is a necessary 
condition for output maximization in the economy ·as a whole. 
15. 
(1.5 ) 
(1.5' ) 
( a ) 
.-____________________________________ ~Oy 
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(ii) The second optimality condition implies that 
aU / aOa 
a x 
= 
aUb / ao~ 
b 
aUb / aoy 
where Px and Py represent the prices of commodities X and Y 
respectively. Condition (1.6)isthe familiar equality between 
A and B's respective marginal rates of substitution of X and Y; 
or 
MRS a 
x,y = MRS b x,y 
This is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below, where the (arbitrarily 
chosen) output mix 0b on the transformation curve determines the 
dimensions of the corresponding box diagram for exchange: the 
origins for individuals A and B are given by 0a and 0b respectively . 
The exchange contract curve'OaOb' represents the locus of output 
mixes for which the respective individual marginal rates of 
substitution are equal; in other words, each point along 0aOb 
indicates the maximum attainable utility of one consumer, given 
the utility level of the other. It thus follows that equality 
between the marginal rates of substitution is a necessary 
condition for maximization of the combined level of individual 
utilities. 15 
15. This is simply another way of defining our second condition 
for Pareto optimaLity; it does, of course , imply that individual 
utilities are comparable and measurable. 
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(iii) The third or "top level" condition may be derived 
from the following identity,16 
where V is the value of the total or combined product of X and· 
Y. Solving for Qy in (1.7) gives: 
which is the mathematical equivalent of an isorevenue or commodity 
price line. 17 Two such price lines are shown in Figure 1.2, viz. 
the parallel lines labelled mm' and nn'. The fact that nn' 
represents a higher V then mm',means that the value of total 
output is in fact maximized at Db' where nn' is tangent to the 
transformation curve, TT'; that is, 
= 
where dQ/dQx is the slope of the transformation curve, or the 
marginal rate of product transformation between X and Y (MRPT y). x, 
Accordingly, a necessary condition for maximization of the value 
of total output is equality between the MRPT y and the corres-x, 
ponding commodity price ratio. 
Similarly, combining (1.6), (1.6') and (1.9) 
gives 
MRS a 
x,y = MRS b x,y = MRPT x,y 
representing equality between the rate at which consumers are 
willing to substitute X for Y at the margin, and the rate at 
16. An alternative - and more conventional - derivation is 
provided in Appendix 2. 
17. See, fer ~xample, Koutsoyiannis (1979, pp. 535-536). 
19. 
(1 .7) 
(1.8 ) 
( 1 .9) 
(1.10) 
20. 
which it is technically possible to do so. This condition is 
indicated in Figure 1.2 by the parallel price lines mm' and nn', 
passing through the equilibrium output ratios 0b and E',respectively. 
A closely related condition, sometimes referred to as the 
"social justice condition", 18 is based on the following equality, 19 
= 
where the lefthand side may be regarded as the rate of change of 
a community indifference curve in output space, or the community 
marginal rate of substitution of X for Y (CMRS y). Although the x, 
related concepts of the social welfare function and the community 
indifference curve are discussed in Appendices 1 anod 2, it should 
be emphasised here that the latter is derived on the assumption 
that the two commodities, X and Y, are optimally distributed 
between the two consumers, A and B. 20 
Combining (1.10) and (1.11) we get : 
CMRS x,y = MRS a = MRS b = MRPT x,y x,y 0 X,Y 
which brings together all the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the maximization of social welfare - the "optimum optimorum".21 
This is shown as the output mix E in Figure 1.3 below , where the 
transformation curve is tangent to the highest attainable community 
indifference curve, W2. Similarly, at E and E' in Figure 1.3 the 
social and individual welfare levels are all maximized simultaneously, 
subject to the given set of constraints. 
18. Layard and Walters (1978, p . 7). 
19. See Appendi x 2. 
200 See Samuelson (1956). 
21. Winch (1971, p. 81). 
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We may therefore conclude that Pareto optimality per se is 
only a necessary condition for the maximization of social welfare. 
The sufficient condition includes (i) equal ity between the community 
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of product 
transformation (e.g. point E in Figure 1.3 ), and (ii) equality 
between the latter rates and the individual marginal rates of 
substitution of X for Y (at point E'). These various rates of 
substitution are, of course, brought into equality via the price 
mechanism of a perfectly competitive economy;22 and in Figure 1.3 
the relevant ratio of Px to Py is given by the slope of the 
parallel price lines mm' and nn'. 
3. The Comparative Statics of Economic Underdevelopment 
What is the significance of Pareto optimality and the 
competitive equilibrium for the process of economic development? 
Here it is necessary to adopt both a comparative static and a 
dynamic approach to the general equilibrium model outlined in the 
previous section. In particular, we need to know how the system 
evolves from one state to another over time -- for example, from 
an in it i a I state of re I at i ve poverty (or affl uence) to one of 
relative affluence (or poverty); and for this purpose, it is 
convenient first to define the development problem formally by 
introducing appropriate exogenous changes into our two-sector 
model of general equilibrium. 
22. Or more precisely . by the omniscient Walrasian auctioneer. 
To begin with, consider the following suggested scenario 
of the emergence of economic underdevelopment. Imagine an 
economy which has led a relatively isolated existence for a 
considerable period of time: in a static sense, it is enjoying 
the kind of "optimum optimorum" discussed in the previous section, 
while dynamically it is approximating a so-called steady state in 
which output, capital and labour are all growing at more or less 
the same constant rate. Suppose the economy is now "opened up,,23 
exogenously by an inflow of capital and/or labour, the effect of 
which is either to raise or lower the prevailing capital/labour 
ratio. It seems reasonable also to assume that the opening·up 
process is localized and confined to one productive sector only, 
assuming that each of the goods (X and V) is also (spatially) 
produced in a specific region within the economy. The opening-
up process accordingly widens existing regional differences in 
the capital/labour ratio, creating similar discrepancies in the 
marginal productivities and output levels per worker within the 
economy as a whole. 
In order· to illustrate the emergence of underdevelopment 
geometrically, we thus distinguish between two regions, X and V, 
each of which produces the correspondingly lettered commodity. 
The initial (static) equilibrium occurs at the output ratio E 
in Figure 1.4(b ), which corresponds to the input ratio E' in 
Figu re 1.4(a) . These ratios represent production of the output 
levels X2 and V2 respectively, at uniform factor prices given by 
23 . Al t hough this term is borro we d from Myint (1954), we attach 
a muc h narro we r mean i ng to it tha n d i d My int . In eithe r case , 
however, t he "open i ng-up process " may be prompted by economic, 
politic al and/or mi l itary cons i derations. 
23. 
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the slope of the factor price line, aa', passing through E'. 
Suppose now that the quantity of capital in region V increases 
by 0yOy' units in Figure 1.4(a). This causes the contract curve 
to shift from 0XOy to 0XOy' in Figure 1.4(a), which implies in 
turn a shift in the transformation curve from TT' to 55' in 
Figure 1.4(b).24 
Now, the effect on factor pricEs depends in part on the 
assumption of constant returns to scale; that is, the fact that 
the marginal productivities of capital and labour are constant 
proportionate functions of the relevant capital/labour ratios. 
It can be shown, for example, that the partial derivatives of 
(1.3) are: 
and 
* * where Kx and Ky represent the capital/labour ratios used in the 
production of commodities X and V, respectively; and a,b,e and f 
are positive constants. According to (1.13) a given increase 
* in Ky will ceteris paribus raise the marginal product of region 
V's labour force, and lower its marginal product of capital, 
relative to those in region X. These changes in the marginal 
productivities of region Yare shown in Figure 1.4(a) by the 
difference between the slope of the new factor price line.bb' 
through E', and the slope of the original price line, aa'. 
Although the equilibrium input ratio (temporarily) remains 
at E', it is clear that region Y is now using more capital 
24. On the nature of these shifts, see Rybczynski (1955). 
25. 
(1.13) 
relative to labour in producing the higher output level given 
by Y3' . The latter increase in the output of Y causes a 
decrease in its relative price -- indicated in Figure 1.4(b) 
by the difference between the slope of the commodity price 
line, pp', and the slope of the original one, nn' passing 
through E. Similarly, the equilibrium output ratio has moved 
from E to F in Figure 1.4(b), where the community indifference 
curve labelled W3 is tangent to the new commodity price line, 
pp'. It is important to note, however, that E' and F now 
represent sub··optimat allocations with respect to 0x0y' and 
SS' in Figures 1.4(a) and 1.4(b), respectively. 
4. Comparative Static Equilibrium: Exit Underdevelopment 
Is the absence of Pareto optimality a permanent or temporary 
state of affairs? The answer depends, of course, on the assump-
tions of perfect competition , unlimited substitutability and 
unrestricted factor mobility, which together ensure that any 
deviation from equilibrium will be " ... automatically redressed 
by the incentive-providing mechanisms of the market". 25 The 
equilibrating nature of the neoclassical economy may be explained 
by a simple extension of the two-sector model. ConSider, for 
example, the following differentials of equations (1.3): 
25. Fei and Ranis (1964). See also Ohlin (1967, Part 3). 
26. 
(1.14) 
Since we are interested here in the interregional allocation 
of a given quantity of resources, let us temporarily assume 
that savings and the natural growth of population are both 
equal to zero. Similarly, let the spatial mobility of capital 
and labour be proportionately related to the corresponding 
differences in the marginal productivities; that is, 
= -dK Y 
or, substituting (1.13) into (1.16), 
And similarly, 
* * = h(bKx - fKy) 
where g and h are positive constants. Substituting (1 . 15) 
(1.18) into (1.14) gives. 
* * * * * * dQx = (a/Kx) g (a/Kx - e/Ky) + (bKx) h (bKx - fKy) 
* * * * * * and dQy = -(e/ky) g (a/Kx - e/Ky) - (fKy) h (bKx - fKy) 
* * * * 
to 
Now, since (a/Kx) > (e/Ky) and (bKx) < (fKy) by assumption, 
it follows from (1.14') that (i) labour will migrate from region 
X to region Y and capital in the opposite direction; (ii) these 
factor flows will in turn reduce the differences in the capital/ 
labour ratio and marginal productivities; until (iii) a stable 
* . * * * 
27. 
(1.15) 
(1.16) 
(1.16') 
(1.17) 
(1.18) 
(1.14' ) 
equilibrium is again reached when (a/Kx) = (e/Ky)' (bKx) = (eKy) 
* and dQx = dQy = 0. The fact that Kx is now higher than 
* before, while Ky is again lower, implies that there has been 
a convergence in the regional output level per labourer. 26 
All this may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1.5 
below, which is a straight reproduction of Figure 1.4. At 
the input ratio E' in Figure 1.5(a), for example, the (real) 
price of capital is assumed to be higher in region X, while 
the price of labour is again higher in region Y. Accordingly, 
labour may be expected to flow from region X to region Y and 
capital in the opposite direction, thus raising (lowering) the 
capital/labour ratio and wage rate, and lowering (raising) the 
interest rate in region X(Y) . These factor movements will 
continue until the interregional differences in factor prices 
have been entirely eliminated at, say, the input ratio G' on 
the contract curve, 0xOy' ---- indicating production of the 
output levels X3 and Y4' at uniform factor prices given by 
the slope of the new factor price line, cc' passing through 
G'. Similarly, since production in each region is now higher 
than before, the economy is able to produce the preferred 
output combination G on the transformation curve 55' in 
Figure 1.5(b), representing the maximum attainable welfare 
level Of ·W4. 
Generally, the above illustration serves to highlight 
the important role played by interregional factor movements 
in the equilization of factor prices. The equilibrating 
nature of such factor flows derives from the fact that 
production factors migrate from regions where their marginal 
26. Th i s follows from the Cobb-Douglas assumption that output 
per worker is a direct proportionate funct i on of the capital/ 
labour ratio. 
28. 
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29 . 
productivity is low, to regions where it is high, thus 
causing a net increase in the (real) output of the economy 
as a whole: this is easily proved by setting 
30. 
= + (1.19) 
where dQt represents the change in the total or combined 
regional output. Substituting (1.14') into (1.19) and 
rearranging terms, we get 
= 
which shows that if 
5. Dynamic Equilibrium and the Steady State 
(1.19') 
Turning to the dynamic equilibrium of the two-sector model, 
it becomes necessary to relax the assumptions of zero savings 
and a constant supply of labour. Both savings and the natural 
growth of labour are important sources of regional economic 
growth generally, and of regional factor mobility in particular; 
and it is our purpose here to determine whether and to what 
extent such factor movements affect the dynamic equilibrium 
of the perfectly competitive economy. 
Before this is done, however, recall that our earlier 
economy was assumed to be spatially differentiated only with 
respect to the technical conditions of production; specifically, 
capital's share of output was higher in region Y than in region 
X. Suppose now that the respective factor prices are initially 
the same everywhere, while the savings propensity and the 
natural growth rate of labour are both constant and spatially 
uniform. Under these assumptions, the growth rates of output 
in the two regions are given by the following familiar 
equations: 27 
where sand n represent the marginal savings propensity and 
the natural growth rate of labour, respectively;28 Ox and 0y 
are the (variable) output/capital ratios in regionsX and Y; 
~ and ~ are capital's share of output in regions X and Y 
respectively; and ~ < ~ by assumption. Now, the steady state 
is generally characterized by the fact that output and capital 
grow at the same constant rate; that is, qx = sax and 
qy = say' whence it follows from (1.20) that 
= n 
Equation (1.21) simply states that in the absence of factor 
mobility, each region will experience steady-state growth 
independently, being determined as it is by the given growth 
rate of its labour supply. But since the latter growth rate 
31. 
(1 .20) 
(1.21) 
27. See, for example, Solow (1956), Swan (1956) and Meade (1961). 
28. Both are assumed to be exogeneously determined by non-
economic factors (See Meade (1961, p. 19» . 
is assumed to be spatially uniform, it follows that both 
regions will grow at the same steady-state rate , n; and 
similarly, the growth rate of the total or combined regional 
output I'IUI also equal n. Likewise, the growth rate of out-
put per worker will be zero everywhere. 
Let us now restate in dynamic terms our earlier account 
of the opening-up process. At a given pOint in time, region 
Y experiences a (net) inflow of capital from abroad, which 
continues for a considerable period of time. This increase in 
the capital stock of region y , eeteris paribus, raises the 
marginal productivity or wage rate of its labour force, and 
lowers its marginal product of capital, relative to those in 
region X. If labour now starts to migrate from region X to 
region Y, and capital in the opposite direction, then the 
growth rates of regional output become : 
q I 
= akx x + ( 1 - a) Ix 
and q I = Bky + (1 - B) Iy Y 
where k x and ky are the growth rates of capital in regions X. 
and Y respectively; and Ix and Iy are the corresponding growth 
rates of the labour supply. Each of these factor growth rates 
is determined both by endogenous and exogeneous variables; for 
example, 
k = x sax + Kyx 
Ix = n + Iyx 
ky = say + kfy + kXY 
Iy = n + Ixy 
32. 
(1.22 ) 
( 1. 23) 
where kyX (k XY ) is the rate at which capital is being transferred 
from region Y(X) to region X(Y); fyx (fxy ) is the rate of labour 
migration from region Y(X) to region X(Y); and kfy is the 
constant rate of foreign capital inflow into region Y. Similarly, 
we know from (1.15) through (1.18) that: 
* * kyX = g (a/Kx - e/Ky) / K x 
* * k . 
= - g (a/Kx - e/Ky) / Ky xy 
* * fyX = h (bKx - fKy) / Lx 
* * fXy = -h (bKx fKy) / Ly 
where Kx and Ky are the quantities of capital, and Lx and Ly 
the quantities of labour used in the production of X and Y, 
respectively. Accordingly, substituting (1.24) into (1.23) 
into (1.22), we have 
* * q' = cds<1x + g (a/Kx - e/Ky) /K) x 
* * * + (1 - cd {n + h (bKx - fK ) Y / Lx } 
* * and q' y = fl{S<1y - g (a/Kx - e/Ky) /Ky } 
* * * * Now, given that (a/K
x
) > (e/Ky) and (bKx) < (fKy)' there 
are two effects that can be distinguished on the basis of 
equations (1.22') . The first effect occurs more or less 
instantaneously and may be referred to as the "non-steady 
state" effect; the second is agaIn a long term effect in the 
sense that it facilitates, and indeed accelerates, the movement 
toward steady-state growth in each region . 
33. 
(1 .24) 
(1. 22' ) 
Firstly, given the presumed differences in factor prices, 
labour will migrate from region X to region Y and capital from 
region Y to region X; that is kyX > 0, kXY < 0, lyX < 0 and 
lXY > O. The immediate or non-steady state effect is thus: 
and 
(q' £.) > 0 
x x 
(q' y 1) < 0 y 
which indicates simply that the growth rate of output per worker 
will be positive in region X, but negative in region Y, thus 
implying a process of convergence in the regional output level 
per worker. 
Secondly, the above factor flows will, ceteris paribus, 
reduce the differences in the capital/labour ratio and marginal 
productivities between regions X and Y; that is, they will 
lower (raise) kyx(kxy ) and raise (lower) l xy (lyx )' But these 
changes in the marginal productivities will be continuously 
offset by the successive inflows of foreign capital into region 
Y; and to the extent that they are, labour (capital) will 
continue to migrate from region X(Y) to region Y(X). Such 
continuous factor flows will, of course, reduce Ox and domestic 
savings in region X, while raising them again in region Y, 
until eventually each region has entered the steady-state 
when Q~ = kx and Qy = ky; that is, 
and 
Q' = n 
x 
Q' y = n + 
34. 
(1.25 ) 
where iyX < 0 and i xy > 0 by assumption. Although q~ is now 
smaller than it was before the presumed inflow of foreign 
capital and the resultant interregional factor flows, i.e . 
q I < q 
X X = = n, the growt.h rate of 
output per worker is again zero in both regions. 
Finally, it is of interest to note that the corresponding 
growth rate of the total or combined regional output is higher 
now than it was before the foreign capital inflow into region Y; 
and similarly, since the natural growth rate of the total labour 
force is exogenously given, it follows that the growth rate of 
output per worker in the economy as a whole will also be higher 
now than before.29 The reason for this is, of course, similar 
to that pertaining to the comparative static analysis of the 
previous section: regional factor mobility makes it possible 
for a perfectly competitive economy to utilize its growing 
resources most efficiently. 
6. CONCLUSlON: The Critical Assumptions 
There is nothing inherent in the neoclassical theory of 
general equilibrium that provides an explanation of the emergence, 
let alone continued existence, of the problem of economic under-
development . In order to analyze the development problem from 
a purely neoclassical perspective, it becomes necessary to 
consider various exogenous changes which have the effect of 
29. These propositions are further explored in Appendix 3 below . 
35 . 
distorting, at least temporarily, the otherwise permanent 
configuration of competitive prices and quantities. But such 
disarrangements will, of course, be automatically eliminated 
by the equilibrating mechanisms operating. within a perfectly 
competitive economy. Indeed, if one were to accept without 
question the neoclassical theory in its pure and unadulterated 
form, there would be no such field as development economics. 
It is generally known, of course, that the predictions of 
the neoclassical model have not come true. There is enough 
evidence indicating that the development question has become 
progressively more problematical over the years. Capital has 
not flowed to the relatively backward, predominantly agricultural 
sectors to any significant extent, and although many labourers 
have migrated to the rich, industrial sectors, only a relatively 
small number has managed to obtain adequate employment. Not-
36. 
withstanding a large and growing supply of labour, entrepreneurs 
in the industrial sectors have tended to use relatively capital-
intensive production techniques. The main reason for this 
pattern of resource allocation lies in the generally imperfect 
, 
nature of the market, especially in developing countries: 30 
constant returns to scale are the exception rather than the rule; 
production functions are characterized by a limited degree of 
factor substitutability; capital and labour are neither completely 
divisible nor perfectly mobile over space; competitive markets 
are conspicuous by their absence, while price and quantity 
adjustments are often disequilibrating due to insufficient 
knowledge on the part of producers and consumers alike. It 
is largely for these reasons that the arch proponents of the 
30. For a devastating critique of the neoclassical theory, 
see Richardson (1973, ch.1). 
(pure) neoclassical theory may be said to be "guided much more 
by logical curiosity than by a taste for relevance". 31 
31. Sen (1971, p. 33). 
37. 
CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE 
FACTOR-PROPORTIONS PROBLEM 
In this chapter we shall consider several theories of economic 
underdevelopment which focus attention on production conditions in 
developing countries. What these theories have in common is an 
analytical approach which essentially amounts to relaxing one or 
more ~f the basic assumptions underlying the production function 
of the neoclassical two-sector model. In section 1 below it is 
argued, for example, that the theory of cumulative causation 
effectively introduces increasing returns to scale in at least 
38. 
one sector or region of the economy; and as may be expected, its 
predictions turn out to be vastly different from those associated 
with the neoclassical assumption of uniform constant returns. 
Similarly, section 2 attempts to compare the dynamic characteristics 
of increasing returns with the convergency properties of the neo-
classical theory of growth. Section 3 introduces the fixed-
proportions production function, which forms the basis of Richard 
Eckaus 's (1955) theory of the "factor-proportions problem". In 
section 4 we consider the implications for the factor-proportions 
problem of Harvey Leibenstein's (1960) suggestion that the impact 
of technological progress is generally limited to those sectors 
of the economy using relatively capital-intensive production 
techniques. Finally, sections 5 and 6 examine the general policy 
implications of the existence of fixed factor proportions, both 
from a static and dynamic perspective. 
1. Differential Returns to Scale: The Theory of Cumulative 
Causation 
The name most closely associated with the theory of cumulative 
causation is that of Gunnar Myrdal. 1 In some of his major works2 
39. 
he has consistently rejected the (neoclassical) "notion" of a stable 
equilibrium: "I feel, indeed, very much in line with ordinary common 
sense when I stress that in the normal case circular causation is a 
more adequate hypothesis than stable equilibrium for the theoretical 
analysis of a social progress".3 According to Myrdal, most social 
progresses are inherently unstable insofar as the behavioural 
relationships between their constituent variables are "cumulative 
because of circular causation". This hypothesis is said to be 
especially relevant .to the process of economic development which 
" ... normally tends to increase, rather than to decrease, the 
inequalities between regiOns".4 
Any given increase in a region's income is assumed to have a 
dual effect on other regions, in the form of the well-known spread 
and backwash effects. The claim that the latter effect usually 
outweighs the former is due largely to the existence of regional 
differences in economies of scale. 5 Specifically, suppose an 
autonomous increase in the income of, say, region Y induces 
increasing returns and raises its marginal productivities and 
1. But see also Hirschman (1957; 1958). 
2. Myrdal (1956; 1957; 1968; 1971). 
3. Myrdal (1957, p. 21). 
4. Ibid. p. 26. 
5. See Myrdal (1957, p. 27), Kaldor (1970) and Dixson and Thirwall 
(1975). 
factor prices relative to those in region X. If factor mobility 
is assumed to depend on the corresponding price differentials 
only, then production factors will move in one direction only 
setting in motion a cumulative process of income expansion in 
region Y at the expense of region X. In the absence of 
"contervai I ing forces", this process could continue ad infinitum 
augmenting regional differences in scale economies, real income 
and employment. 
Such cumulative processes have, of course, been recognized 
long before and made implicit in the familiar notion of the 
"viscious circle,,;6 similarly, growing interregional inequalities 
have been explained in terms of the "cumulative" nature of the 
Keynesian multiplier process.? Nevertheless, when it was first 
applied to the problem of economic underdevelopment,S the theory 
of cumulative causation initiated a fairly radical departure from 
the ruling neoclassical orthodoxy. The basic idea behind the 
theory has recently re-emerged in various writings associated 
. 9 
with the so-called dependency or "neo-Marxist" school. These 
40. 
writers contend that past colonial empires and such "neo-colonialists" 
as the multinational corporation have both played an important 
role in initiating and perpetuating a process of "development of 
underdevelopment". Through various forms of international trade, 
investment and technological transfer, for example, multinational 
companies establish a so-called "enclave" economy within the 
6. See, for example, Nurske (1953, p. 4). 
7. Truu (1973) and Armstrong and Taylor (1978). 
8. Myrdal (1944) 
9. See Baran (1957), Frank (1967, 1969, 1975, 1977), Furtado (1970), 
Sunkel (1969, 1973a, 1973b), Dos Santos (1970, 1973), Szentes (1971) 
and Cardoso (1973). See also O'Brein (1975). 
typical developing country, which eventually becomes fully 
integrated with the "internationa I capital i st system"; The 
41. 
chief function of the enclave is that of profit (or "surplus value") 
maximization, which it does inter alia by partially destroying 
traditional (handicraft) industries and retarding or distorting 
indigenous processes of social and economic change. 10 Implicit 
in the dependency argument is the belief that backwash or polariza-
tion effects far outweigh what spread effects may emanate from the 
enclave economy, at least during the early stages of development. 
Whatever the reasons may be , it is difficult indeed to reject 
the hypothesis of a "long swing in the .inequality characterizing 
the secular income structure"; 11 that is, much of the available 
evidence suggests that regional income inequalities are greatest 
in the poorest countries of the world. 12 By the same token, 
however, it must be conceded that beyond a certain threshold 
level of development, such regional inequalities tend to 
diminish as the spread effects gradually gain in importance 
over the backwash efforts . 13 This is presumably what Hirschman 
(195B, p. 189) had in mind when he wrote: "Myrdal's analysis strikes 
me as excessively dismal ... he fails to recognise that the emergence 
of growing pOints and therefore of differences in development between 
regions and between nations is inevitable and is a condition of 
further growth anywhere". 
10. Frank (1967; 1969) and Hodgkin (1972). 
11. Kuznets (1955, p. 18) . 
12. Ade lman and Morris (1973), Paukert (1973) and Ahluwal i a (1976). 
13. See also Bauer (1963) and Bauer and Yamey (1967). 
It seems worth analyzing the general equilibrium .implications 
of cumulative causation in terms of the two-sector model developed 
in the previous chapter. For this purpose, it is useful first to 
note that Myrdal (1957, p. 27) himself referred to the phenomenon 
of economies of scale "in the broadest possible sense" - that is, 
it includes both internal economies and such external economies as 
ownership, technical and public goods externalities. 14 The 
existence of internal or external economies implies, of course, 
that the average cost of production is falling and exceeds the 
marginal cost over the relevant range. Such a situation either 
leads to complete market failure under perfectly competitive 
conditions, or it gives rise to monopolistic or oligopolistic 
pricing behaviour according to which price is set above the marginal 
cost of production; 15 in either case, "the correspondence between 
market-directed and welfare-maximising allocation fails".16 
In what follows here, however, we shall for expositional 
purposes ignore the general equi~ibrium properties of imperfectly 
competitive markets, and assume instead that price is set equal 
to the marginal cost of production - for example, by a Lange-
Lerner type of bureaucracy.17 While the role of monopoly in 
economic development will be more thoroughly examined in Chapter 3, 
it is worth noting here that the presumed existence of (competitive) 
42. 
14 . See, for example , Bator (1958) and Koutsoyiannis (1979, ch. 23). 
15. Ibid. 
16 . Bator (1957, p. 404). 
17 . See Bator (1957). 
shadow prices is unlikely to affect our subsequent analysis of 
increasing returns to any significant extent : "The marginal-rate-
of-substitution conditions .••• retain their validity, and the 
solution still gives out a set of shadow prices, or decentralized 
responses, which result in the (optimal) configuration of inputs, 
outputs and commodity distribution" .18 
43. 
Starting from an initial equilibrium situation in Figure 2.1(a), 
let us introduce increasing returns into region Y only, such that 
they occur at a uniform rate over the full range of inputs and 
outputs; specifically, suppose that equal proportionate increases 
in capital and labour inputs give rise to constant, but propor-
tionately larger, increases in output over the relevant range. 19 
This implies that the distance between consecutive Y-isoquants 
become progressivety smaller as one moves farther away from Y's 
origin; or put differently, the effect of increasing returns is 
to shift the Y-isoquants successively closer to Oy' for example 
from Y2 and Y4 to Y2 and Y4 respectively. This also explains why 
the transformation curve in Figure 2.1(b) becomes generally less 
concave than before, and why it may even change its shape 
altogether from being concave to being convex to the origin; 
indeed, it is quite possible that the degree of convexity of the 
transformation curve may be such as to yield a so-called corner 
solution. 20 
18. Ibid. p. 408. 
19. See also Koutsoyiannis's (1979, pp. 79-81) treatment of 
increasing returns occurring at constant and variable rates. 
20. 8ator (1957). 
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These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 2.1(b) . Firstly, 
if increasing returns were to occur at a relatively modest rate in 
region Y, then the transformation curve might shift from TT' to its 
less concave counterpart ST', in which case the equilibrium output 
mix would change from point E to pOint F. Alternatively, should 
increasing returns occur at a sufficiently high rate, then the 
transformation curve could become convex to the origin, such as 
RT' in Figure 2.1(b). In this case a corner solution may be 
established at a new equilibrium output mix, for example point R 
where the community indifference curve labelled W3 intersects RT'. 
The significance of the latter equilibrium is simply the fact that 
the tota~ supplies of capital and labour are now being used in the 
production of Y only: assuming "appropriate" demand conditions, 
the increase in the marginal productivities (and factor prices) 
has been such as to induce X's entire factor supplies to migrate 
to region Y, thus raising output in Y considerably while lowering 
it to zero in region X. 
2. Differential Returns and Dynamic Equilibrium 
The dynamic properties of differential returns to scale may be 
explained by 'means of a simple extension of the neoclassical growth 
model developed in the previous chapter. 21 First, recall the 
neoclassical growth equations, 
21 . See also Eltis (1'973, ch. 11) . 
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x = '" k + x ( 1 
and y 
where the underlying production functions are assumed to portray 
constant returns to scale. If we now introduce increasing returns 
into region Y, then 
y' = 
where A > 1 and indicates the degree of increasing returns. Now, 
it can .be shown that steady state growth implies that y' 
or 
y' = A(1 - 13) iy / (1 - A13) 
= k .22 y' 
where A (1 - 13)/(1 - A13) > A. Increasing returns thus have the 
effect of raising the neoclassical growth rate by a multiplier of 
A(1 - 13)/(1 - A13); that is, it " .... multiplies the growth that is 
due to any other source, such as growth in the industrial labour 
force ..... thus magnifying the advantages countries obtain from 
other sources of growth".23 
It is perhaps worth noting here that the latter conclusion is 
consistent with Verdoorn's (1947) law, which has been frequently 
verified empiriCally,24 and which simply states that there is a 
46. 
(2.1 ) 
(2.2 ) 
(2.3) 
(2.4 ) 
strong correlation between the rate of growth of labour productivity 
and the rate of output growth; for example, 
22. Hahn and Matthews (1964, p. 333). 
23. Eltis (1973, p. 258). It might be added that if increasing 
returns were to occur at an increasing rather than constant rate, then 
this would provide a further magnifying effect on the growth rate of Y. 
24. See, for example, Kaldor (1966). 
47. 
y (2.5) 
or y = Iy / (1 - n ) (2.5') 
where n is known as the "Verdoorn coefficient". If 0 < n < 1, 
as seems likely, then the (neoclassical) growth rate is again 
raised by a multiple, in this case of 1/{1 - n} 
Finally, recall that in our present example regions X and Y 
are assumed to experience constant and increasing returns to scale, 
respectively. The steady state is accordingly characterised by 
(x - Ix) = 0 and (y - Iy) > O. This implies, generally, that the 
growth rate of output per worker will be positive in those regions 
experiencing increasing returns to scale, while it will be zero 
(or negative) for regions subject to constant (or decreasing) 
returns to scale. Consequently, the predictions of the 
differential returns hypothesis turn out to be quite different 
from the convergency properties of the neoclassical growth theory: 
Myrdal's theory of cumulative causation envisages a process of 
regional divergence in the output level per worker. 
3. The "Factor-proportions Problem" 
Although the "factor-proportions problem" was introduced to 
the literature on economic development by Richard Eckaus (1955},25 
it has in fact a long, time-honoured history beginning with such 
classical writers as Ricardo (1951, pp. 76-77) and Mill (1965, 
pp. 63-65). Subsequently, Pareto (1887, p. 717) described it 
25. See also Dorfman (1953) and Fukuoka (19551. 
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as follows: " in order to produce a given amount of silks, 
one requires an area of land to erect a factory, but, afterwards, 
even if one doubles this area, without increasing the other 
capital goods, the product will not be increased at all". 
Limited factor substitutability has since" been viewed as an 
important source of unemployment during the crisis years of the 
1930's26 ---- notwithstanding the emphasis given at the time to 
the Keynesian notion of deficient demand. It is interesting to 
note too that Hicks (1947) considered the existence of fixed 
factor proportions to be a critical determinant of the twin 
problems of unemployment and inflation that existed in Europe 
during the immediate postwar period. 
In the field of development economics, it has long been felt 
that the problems of factor underutilization generally, and of 
labour unemployment in particular, are at least partly caused by 
the fact that entrepreneurs are faced with a limited range of 
relatively capital-intensive production techniques. The origin 
of this type of production function lies with what Hans Singer 
(1970-71, p. 64) has called the system of internationat 
technological dualism ----" .... the fact that knowledge is 
accumulated by the richer countries, in the richer countries 
and in respect to the problems of the richer countries".27 
Such a monopoly of knowledge enables the developed countries 
to control both the volume and composition of technical innovations 
26. Keynes (1936, p. 296), Kaldor (1938, pp. 643-644) and 
Robinson (1965, pp. 78-80). 
27. See also Singer (1975), Streeten (1971), Stewart (1972; 1974), 
Cooper (1972) and Helleiner (1975). 
and inventions in the world at large, as well as their eventual 
transfer to developing countries through international trade and 
investment. However, since most innovations are initially planned 
and designed in developed countries where labour tends to be 
relatively scarce and expensive, their application generally 
requires large quantities of capital relative to labour. 28 It 
is the application (without adaptation) of such innovations in 
developing countries which has led Eckaus (1955), Higgins (1958, 
ch. 14) and others29 to observe that despite the relative 
abundance and cheapness of labour, production in these countries 
is often characterized by fixed factor proportions of a capital-
intensive nature. 
Both Eckaus and Higgins divide the typical developing economy 
49 . 
into two sectors or regions of economic activity, namely a capitalist 
or industrial sector and a traditional, predominantly agricultural 
sector. In the former sector there is either in fact, or 
entrepreneurs perceive there to be ,fixed technical coefficients of 
production : "If managers and technicians, used to particular 
methods of production in Western countries which they accept 
without question as superior, do not look for alternative 
techniques more suitable to the factor endowment, the effect 
is the same as if coefficients lJere technoIogicaUy fixed. ,,30 
28. ~Un (1971) and Arrighi (1970) maintain that the choice 
of techniques may be influenced by a desire on the part of multi-
national companies to economise on the use of "foreign II labour 1 
whether it be skilled or unskilled. 
29. See Seers (1972) and the references li sted in footnote 27 . 
3~. Higgins ( 1968, p. 301 Iltalics added ) ). See also Eckaus 
(195 5 , p. 353), 
Reverting to our two-sector model, let us suppose that the 
production of Y is in fact characterized by fixed factor 
proportions;31 that is, 
Y = min (a Ka. y' 
where K~ and L~ are the avaiLabLe supplies of capital and labour 
50. 
(2.6) . 
in the capitalist sector, Y, and a and v are fixed (or "selected,,)32 
technical coefficients representing the output/capital and output/ 
labour ratios respectively. If aK~<v L~, then 
Y = aK~ = v (La y - U) Y 
where Uy represents labour unemployment. Let K~ = Ky and 
(L~ - Uy) = Ly be the quantities of capital and labour 
actually used in the production of Y respectively; then 
Y 
or (v/a) Ly 
represents the fixed-proportions production function for sector Y. 
This is shown in Figure 2.2 by the ray O'yA' whose slope, via, 
measures the (fixed) capital/labour ratio used in the production 
of Y. 
Similarly, production techniques in the traditional sector, 
X, are assumed to be variable albeit within a limited range of 
factor proportions only ; that is, sector X's factor absorption 
31 . The alternative case in which factor proportions are variable 
(2.6') 
(2 .6") 
(2.7) 
but neve rtheless perce ived to be fi xed J will be discussed in section 
5. 
32. They are referred to as s elected coefficients if there are 
more than one production process a vailable. (see Allen (1967, p. 36 ) ). 
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capacity is constrained by a limited degree of factor " substitutability. 
Such a production function is shown in Figure 2.3, where the ridge 
lines, O~G' and O~H' , represent loci of input proportions for which 
the respective marginal productivities of capital and labour are 
zero; for example, if labour is added to the fixed quantity of 
O~K~ capital units, then its marginal product will soon fall to 
zero at point R', beyond which additional labour units will simply 
remain unemployed or underemployed. 33 
Let us now combine Figures 2.2 and 2.3 to form the Edgeworth 
box diagram shown in Figure 2.4(a) below. 34 Ignoring for the 
moment the ray O~J', the efficiency locus or path of maximum total 
output may be derived simply by finding the maximum output of X, 
for every given V-output along the ray, O;A': for example, if the 
output of sector Y is at level Y3, then the maximum attainable 
X-output is given by X2 along the ridge line, O~H' . Applying 
this procedure to each level of output Y, we obtain the efficiency 
locus, consisting of the line segments O'E' cum A'E' and E'O' in x y 
Figure 2.4(a). This information may now be used to trace out the 
corresponding transformation curve, AEOy in Figure 2.4(b), where 
the segments AE and EOy accord with the segments O~E' cum A'E' 
and E'O; of the efficienty locus, respectively. It should be 
noted that while output combinations along EOy indicate full 
employment of both factors in the economy as a whole, the output 
combinations given by AE represent at least some labour unemploy-
ment. 
33. While the distinction between unemployment and underemployment will 
be made more explicit in Chapter 3, suffice it to mention here that under-
employment generally refers to a situation in which a limited amount of 
work is being shared out between an excessively large number of 
available ~orkers. 
34. This diagram is similar to the one used by Eckaus (1955, p. 369) 
in his analysis of the factor-proportions problem. 
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In purely theoretical terms, the wage rate under-competitive 
labour market conditions will be zero for output combinations 
lying on the labour-unemployment segment, AE in Figure 2.4(b), 
corresponding to the input combinations given by O'E' cum A'E' 
x 
in Figure 2.4(a) . However, it is surely more realistic to assume 
that variations in the wage rate are constrained institutionally 
by a given minimum (and positive) value. 35 The implications of 
such a minimum wage for the factor-proportions problem may be 
explained with the aid of Figure 2.4.36 Let the minimum wage 
55. 
be given by the slope of the factor price line aa' passing through 
point M' on sector V's expansion path, 0; A'. Assuming profit 
maximizing behaviour in both sectors, the constrained or "limited" 
factor input ratio for sector X is then determined at point N'; while 
the slope of price line bb' wi l l be equal to that of aa,.37 
Similarly, the assumption of constant returns to scale ensures 
that the ray O~N', extended to J', represents a locus defined by 
factor price lines whose slopes all equal that of bb' or aa': in 
other words , the imposition of the minimum wage reduces sector X's 
feasible output region from O'G'O' H' to O'G'O' J' in Figure x y x Y 
2.4(a); and similarly, it causes the efficienty locus to shift 
35. While this possibility is also briefly considered by Eckaus 
(1955, pp. 373-374), the role of factor price distortions in economic 
development will be more thoroughly explored in Chapters 3 and 4. 
36. For a general equilibrium analysis of minimum wages, see 
Johnson (1969), Krauss and Johnson (1974, pp. 142-148), Brecher (1974) 
and Baldry (1980, ch. 5). 
37. See 8aldry (1980, pp . 139-141). 
from 0' E' cum A'E' and E'O' to O'F' cum A'F' and F'O' and the 
x Y' x Y' 
transformation curve from AEOy to AFOy.
38 Accordingly, the 
effect of the minimum wage is to !engthen the labour-unemployment 
segment of the transformation curve from AE to AF in Figure 2.4(b). 
Let us now examine the role played by demand conditions in 
determining the magnitude of the factor-proportions problem.39 
Consider, for example, the community indifference curves labelled 
W1 and W2 in Figure 2.5 below, indicating a re!ative!y strong 
community preference for ·commodity Y. Equilibrium is established 
at Z where the community indifference curve; W2, is tangent to 
.JV. 
the labour-unemployment segment AE of the constrained transformation 
curve. But since the latter equilibrium implies the existence of 
labour unemployment, it follows that the community is faced here 
with a conflict between maximum social welfare on the one hand, 
and overall full employment on the other: although it is technically 
possible to attain full employment of both factors at the output 
mix E, this would .clearly imply a decrease in the level of social 
welfare from W2 to W1 in Figure 2.5. Moreover, it is Eckaus' s 
contention that the transformation curve of the typical developing 
country consists mainly of labour-unemployment segments such as AE 
in Figure 2.5; and if this is indeed the case, then the existence 
of a trade-off relationship between full employment and maximum 
welfare becomes a very real possibility: " ..... technology, factor 
endowments and final demand may combi ne in ways which make it very 
difficult for underdeve loped areas to solve their problems of 
un emp loyment and underemployment". 40 
38. It should be added that the m1n1mum wage i s only effective or 
binding for those input and output ratios lying on the labour-unemploy-
ment segment 0 F' cum A'F' in Figure 2.4(a), or AF in Figure 2.4(b). It 
thus follows ttat the wage rate will be higher in both sectors for those 
ratios l ying on the remaining segments of the efficiency locus and 
transformation curve. 
39. Eckaus (1955, pp. 363-364) . 
40. Eckaus (1955, p. 272) . 
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4. Inappropriate Technology and the Factor-proportions Problem 
Harvey Leibenstein (1960) has put forward a theory of technolo-
gical progress which has an important bearing on the factor-
proportions problem. His basic hypothesis is that technological 
progress occurs mainly in the economically advanced sectors or 
regions, where it gives rise to relatively small and gradual 
improvements in the quality of given types of capital equipment. 
In the traditional sector where the capital/labour ratio and the 
wage rate are low, however, the likelihood of recognizing opportunities 
for such marginal innovations is limited indeed, while the scale of 
operations may also be too small to support even small technical 
improvements in the capital stock. 41 Accordingly, technological 
progress (of a capital-using type) is more likely to raise factor 
productivities in those sectors of the economy using relatively 
capital-intensive production techniques. 42 
Leibenstein implicitly assumes the existence of a single, 
uniform production function for the economy as a whole. Consider, 
for example, the linear production function consisting of a limited 
number of fixed-proportions .processes. shown in Figure 2.6. Techno-
logical progress is assumed to raise the productivity of those 
production processes for which the capital/labour ratio is 
relatively high rather than low; that is, it causes a shift in 
the isoquant from 01 to 0; .43 But since the latter processes are 
used in one or only a few sectors of the economy, Leibenstein 
41. This is precisely the reasoning underlying Todaro's (1969) view 
that production functions exhibit greater returns to scale for capital-
intensive as opposed to labour-intensive production techniques. 
42. See also Bruton (1965, p. 41) and the references listed in footnote 
27 above. 
43. See Lelbenstein (1960 , p. 354). 
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maintains that while technological progress has the greatest 
effect on the choice of techniques in the more capital-intensive 
sectors, it leaves production techniques in the more labour-
intensive sectors virtually unaffected. 
When applied to the two-sector model above, Leibenstein's 
proposition essentially amounts to the introduction of capital-
using technological progress in the capital-intensive sector of 
the economy. This may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2.7. 
The initial efficiency locus is again given by the line segments 
O'E' cum A'E' and E'O' in Figure 2.7(a), from which is derived the x y 
transformation curve AEOy in Figure 2.7(b). Demand conditions 
initially determine a fu~~-emp~oyment equilibrium at E, where the 
community indifference curve labelled W1 is tangent to the trans-
formation curve. Now suppose a given technological innovation 
enables sector Y to employ fewer units of both capital and labour 
in the production of any given level of output Y; and similarly, 
the fact that the innovation is assumed to be capital-biased means 
that sector Y now uses more capital relative to labour than before. 
The Y-isoquants accordingly shift from Y1 and Y2 to, say, Yi and Y2 
in Figure 2.7(a). The corresponding shift in the efficiency locus 
60. 
results from the fact that production process O;B' is assumed to 
"dominate" process O?' : for example, if sector X produces the output 
level, X2, then the maximum attainable V-output is given by Y3 along 
ray O;B', rather than by Y2 along ray O;A'. Repeating this process 
yields a new efficiency locus, comprising the line segments O~F' cum 
B'F' and F'O;. This implies, in turn, a shift in the transformation 
curve from AEOy to BFOy in Figure 2.7(b), thus effectively lengthen-
ing the labour-unemployment segment from AE to BF. Likewise, the 
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0' v 
H' 
KV 
equilibrium output mix moves from E to Z, where the' community 
indifference curve, W2, is tangent to the new transformation curve. 
However, since the latter equilibrium is tangent to the labour-
unemployment segment, BF, it follows that the technological 
innovation has in fact given rise to labour unemployment in the 
economy as a whole. 
Generally, the above example serves to illustrate how an 
inappropriate technological innovation ---- or one that is ill-
suited to the factor proportions in question ---- could aggravate 
the employment problem within a typical developing country. But 
the unemployment thus created is not, of course, the result of 
technological progress per se : rather, it arises from the fact 
that the innovation is being applied to production processes 
characterized by limited factor substitutability. 
5. Policy Implications of the Factor-proportions Problem 
The solution to the factor-proportions problem depends in part 
on whether such proportions are in fact technologically fixed, or 
whether they are actually variable, but nonetheless perceived to be 
fixed. If the latter illusion applies, for example, then there is 
clearly a need to inform entrepreneurs of the availability of 
alternative production techniques, at least one of which is likely 
to improve the profitability of their business. This proposition 
62. 
is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2.8. The (representative) 
firm's actual production function is given by solidly drawn isoquants 
/ 
/ 
/ 
a 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
A' 
O'vL---------------------------------~~------
a' Lv 
FIGURE 2.8 
63. 
labelled Y1 and Y2. For reasons discussed earlier, however, the 
firm believes that the ray, 0yA', represents its only feasible 
production process. Accordingly, if price line aa' indicates the 
firm's cost constraint, then equilibrium will ostensibly occur at 
point E', where aa' is tangent to the (perceived) L-shaped isoquant 
labelled Yi . But E' does not, of course, represent the true 
profit maximizing equilibrium, insofar as it is indeed technically 
feasible to produce the higher output level Y2, by means of the 
input combination given by E. Likewise, if all firms could be 
persuaded to use such optimal factor proportions indicated by 
pOint E in Figure 2.8, then it should be possible for the economy 
as a whole to produce along its (true or unconstrained) trans-
formation curve, and hence to achieve full employment of both 
production factors at all times. 
Alternatively, the existence of fixed factor proportions calls 
for an entirely different set of policy measures. In particular, 
it would be necessary here to devise a feasible range of new 
production techniques more suited to the factor endowment and 
demand conditions of the country in question. 44 The introduction 
of a new, more labour-intensive production process would , for 
example, shorten the labour-unemployment segments of the 
efficiency locus and the transformation curve, and in so doing 
increase the likelihood of the economy attaining a full employment 
(static) equilibrium . This is illustrated in Figure 2.9 where, as 
before, the initial efficiency locus is given by the line segments 
44 . See, for example, Pack and Todaro (1969), ·Sutcliffe (1971, 
ch.5 ) , Morawe t z (1974), Timmer et.aL (1975) and Pack (1976). 
64. 
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O'E' cum A'E' and E'O' in Figure 2.9(a), from which is derived 
x y 
the transformation curve AEOy in Figure 2.9(b). Let us now 
introduce a new production process in sector Y, represented by 
the ray O;C' in Figure 2.9(a). This implies, of course, that 
sector Y is now able to use either process 0yA' or process 0yC', 
or indeed some combination of the two processes. Since the 
derivation of the new efficiency locus and transformation curve 
is similar to the derivation procedure used previously , suffice 
it to mention here that the former now consists of the segments 
O~M' cum C'M', M'N', N'P' and P'Oy ; and likewise,the new 
transformation curve consists of the similarly lettered segments, 
CM, MN, NP and POy . 
It is evident that the labour-unemployment segment has been 
considerably shortened, for example from AE to CM in Figure 2.9(b). 
Likewise, the fact that the new equilibrium output mix now occurs 
at Z, implies that the economy has moved from a position of labour 
unemployment at U, to one representing both full employment and 
maximum social welfare. Consequently , the introduction of the new, 
more labour-intensive production technique has effectively removed 
the trade-off relationship that existed between full employment 
and maximum welfare. 
6. Economic Growth and Fixed Factor Proportions : Further Policy 
Considerations 
We finally turn to the dynamic policy implications of the 
factor-proportions problem . Consider, for example, the derivative 
66. 
of the proquction function for Y (i.e. equation {2.6"} above): 
dY = odKy = vdLy 
Substituting 0 = Y/Ky and v = Y/Ly into (2.8), we get : 
or = i. y 
where y, ky and i.y represent the growth rates of output, capital 
and labour employment, respecti vely. Suppose now i. y < i. ~, where 
i.~ indicates the growth rate of the labour supply in sector/region 
Y, assumed to be exogenously determined. The corresponding growth 
rate of labour unemployment is then given by uy = i.~ - i.y • 
In contrast to the neoclassical theory of growth, it is highly 
unlikely that the present economy will attain full employment 
automatically. This foliows immediately from the fact that: 
dKy = Sy Y 
or ky = os y 
where Sy is the marginal savings propensity in region Y. 
Accordingly, in the absence of interregional factor movements, 
it would just not be possible to raise ky (and i.y ) in view of 
the presumed constancy of 0 and Sy. Should production factors 
be mobile, however, it would be possible, at least, to attain 
overall full employment if labour were to migrate from region Y 
to region X and/or if capital flowed in the opposite direction. 
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(2.8) 
(2.8' ) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
But this would, in turn, require that wx > wy' rx < ryand 
kx > £x' Such an equilibrium would be purely cOincidental, 
since the existence of fixed factor proportions implies that 
the various growth rates and factor prices are determined 
independentty from one another. 45 An equilibrium thus 
established would be tantamount to what Joan Robinson (1965) 
has called a "golden age", or "a mythical state of affai rs not 
likely to obtain in any actual economy". 
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The dynamic policy implications of fixed factor proportions 
are essentially threefold. In the first place, a strong case could 
be made for the implementation of labour-using technological 
innovations and inventions, the effect of which would be similar 
to that associated with the comparative static analysis of the 
previous section: for example if £~ > £y' then the effect of such 
a policy should be to raise the growth rate of labour employment 
by uy ' whence it follows that ky = £y = £. ~, where 1;' = £y + uy' 
Secondly, it may be possible to reduce the rate of population 
growth,~nd hence the growth rate of the labour supply too, if it is 
feasible to lower the average fertility rate in the country.46 This 
could in principle be done in several ways. One possibility would 
be to use the existing communications and educational media as a 
means of informing the general public about the economic advantages 
of small-sized families . Another is the establishment of family 
planning clinics whose task it would be to give advice on available 
birth-control measures, while at the same time offering abortion 
services and a suitable range of contraceptives. Likewise, many 
45. See, for example , Singh (1966, ch . 2). 
46. See, for example, King (1974) and Todaro (1977, pp. 157-161). 
It has b een estimated (Enke (1967) and Zaidan (1971» that the 
sociaL returns of such a policy are likely to be much higher than 
those associated with most other forms of investment. 
countries have recently introduced various financial incentives 
and disincentives in an attempt to encourage small-sized families, 
birth spacing and delayed marriages. 47 In terms of our earlier 
notation, the desired effect of these measures would be to lower 
the growth rate of the labour supply by uy ' so that ky = 1y 
a, a 48 
where 1y = (1y - uy). 
A third remedy to the factor-proportions problem consists in 
raising the growth rate of the capital stock; given fixed factor 
proportions, for example, this should cause a corresponding 
increase in the growth rate of labour employment. Increased 
capital growth could be achieved through (i) the creation of more 
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and better savings institutions and the implementation of appropriate 
monetary policy measures49 ; (ii) the use of various direct and 
indirect taxes50 ; and (iii) the encouragement of foreign investment. 
Here again the desired effect should be to raise the growth rates 
of capital and labour employment by uY' whence k' l' 
a 
= = 1y ' Y Y 
where K; = ky + uy and l' = 1y + uy. Y 
47. See Todaro (1977, pp. 158-159) . 
48. For a dissenting view, see Bauer (1981). 
49. See Higgins (1968, ch. 23) and Meier (1976, pp . 267-270). 
50. See Thirlwall (1972, ch. 8; 1976, ch . 2). 
CHAPTER 3 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT: 
THE CLOSED ECONOMY 
Much of the postwar literature on economic development has 
focused on the imperfectly competitive structure of markets in 
general. Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1959) for example, have 
shown how differences in the structure of markets between the 
developed and developing countries could turn the terms of trade 
against the latter. Myint (1954), Eckaus (1955) and others 1 have 
again pOinted to numerous barriers to entry which limit the degree 
of competition in both the product and the factor markets in 
developing countries. Similarly, Lewis (1954), Ranis (1973), 
Todaro (1971; 1977) and several recent studies by the Inter-
national Labor Office (ILO) (1970; 1972), have observed that 
domestic factor markets are characterized by the existence of 
minimum wage legislation and also by distorted capital prices. 
The effect of such price distortions generally is to limit the 
growth of employment and income opportunities, which is often 
aggravated by certain patterns of spatial factor mobility: 
Myrdal (1957) and Todaro (1969) both argue, for example, that 
the mobility of production factors tends to be spatially dis-
equilibrating insofar as it aggravates urban unemployment and 
widens per capita income differentials within developing countries. 
It is indeed this very spectrum of "market imperfections" which 
prompted Todaro (1971, p. 396) to remark: " ... it is now becoming 
1 . See for example, Johns o n (1962) am Little et. al. (1970). 
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painfully apparent how the conventional wisdom of economic 
theory, which placed top priority on the rapid accumulation· 
of capital as the key to successful economic progress in the 
1950's and early 1960's, has led to the serious employment 
pred i cament of the 1970' s" . 
In this chapter we shall consider in some detail the 
employment and the general equilibrium implications of market 
imperfections --- that is, of the various price distortions 
that pervade the product and the factor markets of a "typical" 
developing country. Product market imperfections mainly refer 
to the existence of various artificial barriers that restrict 
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entry by new firms into relatively profitable industries, thus 
limiting output and raising prices above their respective 
competitive levels. But such barriers do not give rise to the 
unemployment problem as such --- they merely "aggravate the 
factor disequilibrium" that already exists in the factor markets .2 
In what follows in this · chapter, we shall be chiefly concerned 
with the employment effects of factor market imperfections; 
only section 1 below refers to the role played by monopolies 
in the product markets of developing countries. Sections 2 and 
3 consider Lewis's dualist theory and Michael Todaro's model 
of rural-urban migration, respectively, and specifically try 
to place them within the general context of factor market 
imperfections. Section 4 examines the relatively recent 
phenomenon of the urban informal sector, emphasizing th~ fact 
that its emergence and continued survival depend in part on the 
existence of various price distortions in the urban areas of 
2 . Eckaus (1955, p . 322 ). 
developing countries. Finally, section 5 discusses the 
general policy implications of market imperfections. 
1. Monopoly, Monopsony and Economic Underdevelopment 
The presence of foreign-owned monopolies and/or oligopolies 
has been a characteristic feature of the "opening-up" process in 
developing countries. 3 These firms have generally been able to 
determine both the price and the quantity supplied of their 
product or service, whether it be for export or for intermediate 
or final demand purposes in the domestic market.4 It is sometimes 
argued that monopoly is a necessary condition for economic 
development during its initial stages, in view of the small size 
of the domestic market, the relati ve costl iness of operations and 
the need to initiate and implement technological inventions and 
innovations. 5 On this view, the general role of monopoly in 
economic development maY ,be likened to that of a natural mono-
polist; that is, the entire market can be supplied by one firm 
onlY ,operating at comparatively low unit cost of production. 
One of the problems with most monopolies is that they tend 
to exist long after the need for them, as set out above, has 
disappeared. Such firms often operate in markets large enough 
to be served by a great many small-sized, competitive firms, 
with the result that the market output is bound to be smaller 
3. See, for example, Myint (1954), Barnett a nd Muller (1974) and 
the references on "dependency" given in footnote 9 of Chapter 2. 
4. Tugendhat (1973, Ch.6), Lall (1973; 1975), Hansen (1975) and 
Vai tsos (1976). 
5. See Hagen (1980; pp. 349-350). 
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and price higher than they would have been under conditions of 
perfect (or free) competition . Moreover. these 'structural' 
imperfections are not limited to product markets only: " •.. in 
a typical process of 'development'. the backward peoples have 
to contend with three types of monopolistic forces: in their 
role as unskilled labour they have to .face the big foreign 
mining and plantation concerns who are monopolistic buyers of 
their labour; in their role as peasant producers they have to 
face a small group of exporting and processing firms who are 
monopolistic buyers of their crop; and in their role as consumers 
of imported ccnmxlities they have to face the same group of firms 
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who are monopolistic sellers of distributors of these commodities" .6 
Reverting to the two-sector analysis of our earlier chapters. 
let us suppose that sector Y represents a monopolist while X is one 
of a (large) number of competitive firms producing a similarly 
lettered commodity. The profit function of Y is given by: 
- c y 
where Cy represents the total production cost of Y. Since Py 
= Py(Oy) by assumption. and C = C(Oy)' we may write (3.1) as 
follows : 
The first-order condition for profit maximization requires that 
the first derivative of (3.1 ') equal s zero ; that is. 
or 
6. Myint (1954 . p . 122). 
(3.1) 
(3 . 1') 
(3.2') 
indicating the familiar equality between marginal revenue and 
marginal cost. The fact that (dPy/dQy) < 0 means, of course, 
that Py exceeds the marginal cost of production. 
Now, the general equilibrium implications of monopoly 
follow from the (given) equality between the marginal rate of 
product transformation on the one hand, and the ratio of the 
marginal cost of X to the marginal cost of Y on the other; or 
= 
where (dCx/dQx) represents the marginal cost of X.7 Accordingly, 
since Py > (dCyldQy) while Px = (dC/dQx) by assumption, we have 
which indicates simply that the third or 'top level' condition 
for Pareto optimality is not being complied with. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 by the difference between the slope 
of the transformation curve, TT', and the commodity price line, 
P1P1', passing through point F: specifically, in contrast to 
7. This is easily proved by means of the following familiar 
identities: 
ilQ lilL 
x x 
and 
wi (de IdQ ) 
x x 
wi (de IdQ ) y y 
Dividing (3f.2) by (3f.1) gives. 
(aQ laL ) I (aQ laL ) (de IdQ ) I (de IdQ ) 
x x y y 
Both since 
y y x x 
dQ IdQ 
Y x (aQ laL ) I (aQ laL ) y y x x 
as shown in Appendix 2 below; it follows that 
(de IdQ ) I (de IdO ) 
x x y-y 
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(3.3) 
(3.4 ) 
(3f. 1 ) 
(3f.2) 
(3f.3) 
(3f.4) 
(3f.4 ' ) 
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the competitive equilibrium at pOint E, the effect of introducing 
monopoly here is to lower the output of Y and raise its relative 
price. 
The situation will be aggravated if we now introduce 
elements of monopsony into the factor markets . Following on 
from the above quotation by Myint, for example, let Y operate 
as a dominant oligopsonist in both factor markets; that is, V 
sets each factor price so as to equate its marginal revenue 
product with the corresponding marginal resource cost.8 This 
implies, of course, that V's marginal revenue product will 
exceed the corresponding equilibrium factor price; or 
w 
and r 
Similarly, if X is the subordinate competitor in both factor 
markets, then 
and 
Finally, on rearranging (3.5) through (3.8) it is clear that for 
most cases,9 
8. For a similar example, see Tisdell (1972, pp. 235-236). 
See also Leftwich (1973, ch. 18). 
9. The exception is the case where the difference between 
sector Y's marginal revenue product and the corresponding 
factor price i s the same in both factor markets. 
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(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
implying that an important efficiency condition for Pareto 
optimality is being violated. This situation is illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 by a point such as G, which lies inside the 
transformation curve, TT'. The effect of introducing mono-
psonistic conditions into the factor markets is thus to distort 
both the product and factor markets of our two-sector economy. 
The policy measures relevant to the present analysis depend 
on whether the firms or industries concerned are 'natural' 
monopolies (and/or oligopolies). If they are not, thp.n it should 
be theoretically possible to enforce a policy of marginal cost 
pricing in those markets characterized by imperfect competition; 
and should competitive conditions continue to exist elsewhere, 
then there is the chance that the policy would enable the economy 
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to attain a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources. 10 Alternatively, 
if at least one firm or sector were a 'natural' monopolist or 
oligopolist, then the policy-maker would need to consider the 
theory of second best, according to which the (second best) 
solution to (Pareto) efficiency entails non-competitive 
pricing in a~~ markets. 11 Under our present assumptions, the 
relevant requirement is simply that the percentage divergence 
of price from the optimum should be the same everywhere: 12 if 
monopoly existed in sector Y but perfect competition in X, for 
example, the optimal output would be that for which price exceeded 
10. See Call and Holohan (1980, pp. 331-332) and Kindleberger and 
Herrick (1977, pp. 193-194). 
11. See Samuelson (1947, pp . 252-253) and Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956-57). 
12. Samuelson (1947, pp. 252-253) and Call & Holohan (1980, p. 332). 
marginal cost by the same proportion in both sectors. 13 Such a 
pricing policy should then enable the economy to achieve at 
least a constrained optimum: "The optimum solution finally 
attained may be termed a second best optimum because it is 
achieved subject to a constraint which by,definition, prevents 
the attainment of a Paretian optimum" .14 
Although the practical implementation o( the latter policy 
is bound to run into numerous problems relating to identifica-
tion and measurement,15 we can at least establish a general 
principle: namely, it " is theoreticaUy possible to achieve 
opt imal i ty by i ntroduci ng price "corrections" des igned to 
counteract those 'structural' distortions which cannot be 
eliminated directly; as Samuelson (1947, p. 252) might put 
it, under these circumstances" .... two wrongs (do) make a 
right". 
2. Factor Market Imperfections and Economic Dualism 
It seems appropriate to begin an analysis of factor 
market imperfections with Arthur Lewis's (1954; 1972; 1979) 
model of economic dualism. The model generally views develop-
ment as a relatively painless process according to which "surplus" 
13. This is J of course J not true of the general case : II ••• there 
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15 no reason to believe that a situation in which there is the same 
degree of monopoly in all industries will necessarily be in any sense 
superior to a situation in which the degree of monopoly varies as 
between industries". (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57, p. 12». 
14. Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57, p. 11). 
15. See Layard and Walters (1978, pp. 180-188). 
labour is transferred from a low-productivity or non~capitalist 
sector, to a high-productivity or capitalist sector. This 
transfer of labour is assumed to occur at a fixed wage, which 
enables capitalists to save, invest and continue employing 
surplus labour during the initial stage of development. 
Economic development is thus made synonymous with increased 
saving and investment: " the central fact of economic 
development is capital acumulation".16 
According to the dualist model, surplus labour in the non-
capitalist sector is not openly unemployed in the conventional 
sense, but is rather 'disguisedly' unemployed or underemployed 
in the ("significant") sense that " ... in many countries the 
market stalls are crowded with people who are not as fully 
occupied as they would wish to be" . 17 A useful interpretation 
of underdevelopment is that provided by Amartya Sen (1968) and 
A.P. Thirwall (1977), and illustrated in Figure 3.2 below. The 
northern portion of the vertical axis measures output in the 
non-capitalist sector , the east represents labour or the number of 
of man- or labour-hours, and the south the number of labourers; 
TP, AP and MP are the total, average and marginal products of 
labour, respectively. Initially, let OS labourers each work 
OA/OS hours to produce the tota l output AQ. If OA/OR hours are, 
16. Lewis (1954, p. 416). 
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17. Lewis (1972, p. 78). The question as to whether underemployment 
represents a situation of zero marginal productivity, has become 
one of the most contentious issues in development economics. 
And yet it is of very little consequence to the Lewis model: 
"Whether marginal product is zero or negligible is not of funda-
mental importance to ·our analysis II (Lewis J 1954, p . 419); indeed, 
in a subsequent paper Lewis (1972, p. 77) regretted every having 
raised the matter at all, claiming that " ... this has merely 
led to an irrelevant and intemperate controversy". 
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s 
labourers 
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however, assumed to represent the 'normal' working time per 
labourer, then underemployment is simply defined equal to RS 
labourers. 18 This may of course imply that the marginal product 
of 1-abourers is zero over some range beyond OA: for example, if 
RS labourers were to leave the non-capitalist sector, then the 
same output of AQ could be produced by OR labourers each working 
OAjOR instead of OAjOS hours. But the marginal product of 1-abour 
is positive and, in Figure 1, equal to the (hourly) wage rate. 19 
Labour is employed up to the point where its marginal product 
is equal to the wage rate, and underemployment takes the form 
of a small number of hours worked per labourer. lilt is not 
that too much labour is being spent in the production process, 
but that too many labourers are spending it". 20 
On the above view, surplus labour is defined analytically 
as simply unemp1-oyed labour which, in the special circumstances 
of developing countries, is 'disguised' or 'hidden' by a re-
distributive system of work (and income) sharing. The only 
peculiarity of the dualist model is then the existence of a 
fixed wage in the non-capitalist sector; but again, Lewis is 
not concerned wi th the actual derivation of this wage: liThe 
model simply postulates as facts that in the initial stage the 
18. See Thirlwall (1977, p. 104). 
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19 . Alternatively, if the wage rate is assumed to equal the average 
product in Figure 3,2, then the initial labour supply of OA hours 
may be explained in terms of a work-leisure trade-off: beyond OA 
labour, for example, the income per unit of time is not considered 
worth the corresponding work effort; but when RS labourers leave 
the non-capitalist sector, each of the remainder (i.e . OR labourers) 
consider the additional income to be worth the extra effort. (See 
also Lewis (1972); Thirlwall (1977); and Uppal (1969». 
20. Sen (1968, p. 3). 
supply of labour at the given wage exceeds the demand, and that 
this condition will continue for some time despite the expansion 
of the capitalist sector".21 For expositional purposes, however, 
we shall continue to assume that the wage rate is equal to the 
marginal product of labour, thus implying the existence of a 
capitalistic wage-payment system in the non-capitalist sector. 22 
The stage is now set for the emergence of Lewis's capitalist 
sector --- which is presumably attributable to the advent of 
foreign investment during the "opening-up" process of economic 
development. 23 In Figure 3.3 the non-capitalist and capitalist 
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sectors are referred to as sectors X and Y respectively. Assume 
that for a given price of capital, wage rates are fixed at given 
minimum values in each sector, determined inter aLia by demographic, 
social and institutional factors .24 Assuming constant returns 
to scale in each sector, let the factor endowment in sector X be 
given by the input combination at J, representing 0xB units of 
capital and 0xC units of labour. Production in sector X initially 
occurs at E indicating employment of 0xB capital and 0xA labour 
units --- assume at the minimum non-capitalist wage given by 
the slope of price line aa'. Surplus labour is thus equal to AC 
unemployed labour units and is, according to Lewis, available to 
sector Y at a (minimum)wage that exceeds the non-capitalist wage 
by some fixed proportion; e.g. 30 Qer cent, to cover the financial 
21. Lewis (1972, p. 77). 
22. The same assumption is made by Fei and Ranis (1961) and 
Myint (1971). 
23. See, for example, Myint (1971). 
24 . These factors are all mentioned in Lewis's original article 
(1954 ) . 
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and psychological costs of a continuous labour transfer .25 If 
sector VIS wage is now given by the slope of price lineww' 
(passing through pOint E), then capital accumulation of 0yJ 
will be needed to induce (the equivalent of) AC labour units 
to migrate from sector X to sector Y. Production in Y will 
occur at E, indicating that OyW labour and 0yJ capital units 
are being used to produce the output level, Ys . Although the 
equilibrium combination at E represents full employment in the 
economy as a whole, it is clearly not Pareto-optimal in view 
of the presumed wage differential between sectors Y and X. 
The amount of capital investment in sector Y depends on 
the prevailing wage differential between sectors Y and X and, 
. more specifically , on the slope of price line ww' in Figure 3.3. 
It is generally acknowledged, however, that such wage differen-
tials have widened considerably during most of the postwar 
period; indeed , labour in the capitalist sector tends to be 
relatively overpriced as a result of the particular wage policies 
persued by post-colonial governments and trade unions. 25 More-
over, capital i s again relatively underpriced due to the existence 
of overvalued exchange rates , artificially low interest rates and 
t · 27 3 3 various forms of tax excemp Ion. In terms of Figure . , the 
effect of such di stort.ions ceteris ooribus will be to rai.se the 
slope of the pr ice li ne in sector Y above that gi ven by ww', thus 
25. Lewis (1954, p . 422). 
26. See, for exampl e, Taira (1 966) and Tidrick (1975) . 
27. Todaro (1971 ). 
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further increasing the, quantity of capital investment needed to attain 
28 
overall full employment (i.e." in both sectors) at the i'nput combination. 
But thi"s would not change the general conclusion of Lewis's model 
in any essential way: that is, for any given wage differential 
between the capitalist and non-capitalist sectors, the cure for 
labour unemployment lies purely and simply with the ability of 
the former sector to accumulate capital. 
The Lewis model is also not much altered if allowance is 
made for a change in the internal or external terms of trade. 
Lewis (1954) himself recognized, for example, that the growth 
of the capitalist sector may turn the terms of trade in favour 
of the non-capitalist sector. In terms of the above example, 
the implication of such a change in the terms of trade would 
be a reallocation of capital from the capitalist to the non-
capitalist sector; and given the corresponding difference in 
the capital/labour ratio, it would also reduce the amount of 
capital investment needed to attain overall full employment. 
We shall return to this point below." 
3. Economic Dualism and Rural-Urban Migration 
It is possible to extend the basic Lewis model by considering 
some additional "imperfections" relating to the mobility of 
production factors. Our chief concern here is with Michael 
Todaro's (1969; 1971) celebrated model of rural-urban migration. 
The model represents perhaps the most significant challenge to 
28. For a similar technical analysis, see Rybczynski (1955). 
the then prevailing theories of labour migration: it is one of 
only a few studies that rejects the presumed two-dimensional 
relationship between labour migration and the corresponding 
wage differential(s) from the outset. Although there have 
been numerous tests of the ('classical') hypothesis of perfect 
factor mobility, it is probably fair to say that most of these 
studies constitute but slight variations on the basic Todaro 
theme. 29 
The primary aim of the model was to "explain the apparently 
paradoxical relationship of accelerated rural-urban migration 
in the context of rising urban unemployment".30 The model itself 
assumes that the migration decision depends not only on the 
relevant wage differential, but also on the probability of 
securing wage employment in the urban sector within a given 
time period. Specifically, if subscripts x and y refer to the 
rural and urban sectors respectively, then 
= 
and Ay = 
where Mxy is the number of labour units migrating from sector X 
to sector Y, wyand Wx are the respective average wage rates, and 
Ay is the (average) probability of obtaining wage employment in 
sector Y - assumed to vary inversely with the urban unemploy-
ment rate, uy. What this implies is that a given decrease in uy 
is sufficient to encourage labour migration from sector X to 
29. See Hart (1975), Berry and Sabot (1978) and Godfrey (1979). 
30. Todaro (1977 , p . 194). 
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(3.10) 
(3 . 11) 
sector Y --- notwithstanding the existence of a given wage 
differential, and irrespective of whether there are in fact 
new job openings available in sector Y. But any subsequent 
loss of income in sector X is more than likely to be offset 
in the minds of the migrants by the expected wage income in 
sector Y; as Todaro (1971, p. 411) puts it: "As long as the 
present value of the net stream of expected urban incomes over 
the migrant's planning horizon exceeds that of the expected 
rural income, the decision to migrate is justified". 
The implication of Todaro's model for the dualist economy 
may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 3.4. Given constant 
returns to scale in each sector, let the output of X again occur 
at E indicating employment of 0i labour and 0xB capital units; 
and similarly, let the remaining labour supply, namely AC = 0yW 
units, be available for employment in sector Y. Suppose now 
that sector Y expands along the path 0/, accumulating 0i 
capital units and employing 0yW labour units, thus reducing 
uy to zero and encouraging additiona! labour to migrate from 
sector X to sector Y. In the absence of further capital 
accumulation, the effect of such migration will be to raise 
uy and lower 1..y again, while at the same time causing a 
relative increase in the rural wage rate, w
x
' Both these 
forces will continue until migration comes to an end at (say) 
pOint G, when MA = WZ additional labour units have migrated 
from sector X to sector Y. These new migrants now became either 
unemployed or underemployed in sector Y where they are able to 
share in the work and income of those already employed; that is, 
the WZ labour units continue to be available for employment 
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at the ruling urban wage, wy' and hence constitute surplus 
labour in the conventional sense of the word, as used in the 
Lewis model discussed above. This implies, of course, that 
the problem of labour underemployment has been simply 
transferred from the rural to the urban sector. 
It is evident that further capital accumulation in sector 
Y will simply raise Ay and induce yet more migration ---- not-
withstanding the counteracting effect of subsequent increases 
in the rural wage, w
x
. For illustrative purposes, one might . 
imagine a situation where capital accumulation in sector Y 
has eventually caught up with migration at a point such as H; 
that is, where the increase in Ay is just offset by the rising 
Wx ---- shown here by the difference between the slopes of price 
line nn' through point H. and the original price line, aa' through 
E. But point H also represents an increase in the capital stock 
equal to 0yJ units in sector Y. Consequently, the implication 
of Todaro's analysis for the Lewis model is that it raises 
considerably the postulated amount of capital needed to provide 
job opportunities to the unemployed in sector Y. 
Generally, the Todaro model suggests that policies aimed 
89. 
at providing employment in the urban areas require disproportionately 
large quantities of capital investment. This is due to the 
existence of factor price distortions generally, and the disequil-
ibrating nature of rural-urban migration specifically, both of 
which tend to raise the amount of capital per unit of labour 
employed in the urban relative to rural sector. It follows 
that the cost, in termS 'of capital accumulation, of providing 
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additional employment opportunities is likely to be much smaller 
in the rural sector than it is in the urban sector. With reference 
to Figure 3.5 ---- which is a partial reproduction of Figure 3.4 ----
it is clear that capital accumulation in sector X would have to 
be accompanied by a corresponding wage increase sufficient to 
offset Ay and reduce Mxy to zero; and as before, such a wage 
increase is given by the difference between the slope of price 
lines along the ray DxH extended, and the initial price line aa' 
through point E. At a pOint such as I, for example, additional 
capital equal to D"J units are needed to attain full employment y 
in the economy as a whole; but since some of this capital, 
namely AA' units, has found its way to sector X, it follows 
that the total amount of additional capital required for full 
employment has been reduced from DyJ to D~J units. 
The fact that this difference in capital accumulation is 
wholly attributable to the differences in factor prices and 
the capital/labour ratio between the urban and rural sectors, 
is obvious enough. Efforts to promote rural development should 
at least in principle raise the probability of obtaining rural 
rather than urban employment, thus limiting the incidence of 
rural-urban migration and further lowering the capital cost 
of attaining overall full employment. 
4. The Urban Informal Sector 
The urban informal sector has received a great deal of 
attention lately. Some observers have found it to be a major 
source of income and employment in the urban areas of developing 
91. 
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countries;31 others have again been impressed by the competitive 
or unregulated state of its markets, its small-scale operations 
and use of labour-intensive production techniques;32 while 
Marxists have denounced it as a "peripheral or marginal activity 
in the world system of capitalist production".33 But despite 
these different emphases, few would deny that the urban informal 
sector owes its existance to the generally imperfect nature of 
the product and the factor markets in urban areas. 34 This 
relationship is partly reflected in the "illegal status" of 
informal sector activities, many of which do not as a rule comply 
with the licensing and other entry requirements imposed by such 
"formal" institutions as local government agencies, professional 
organizations, business associations and trade unions. 
The origin of the urban informal sector may be related 
to the process of rural-urban migration according to Todaro. 
But instead of becoming unemployed or underemployed in the 
urban sector, newly arrived migrants are often able to raise 
capital and start new productive activities which are, on the 
whole, " . . . economically efficient, productive and creative".35 
Although the distinction between an underemployed person and 
informal sector employee may not be too apparent, it is never-
theless an analytically important one: whereas the underemployed 
are " ... consumers of, but non-contributors to, the national 
36 product", informal enterprises not only contribute to the 
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31. See, for example, Sethuraman (1977) and Souza and Tokrnan (1976) . 
32 . ILO (1972). 
33. Davies (1979, p. 91). See also Leys (1975). 
34. See Truu and Black (1980). 
35 . ILO(197 2 ,p . 51). 
36 . Fei and Ranis (1961). 
national product37 but they do so by using relatively labour-
intensive production techniques . Such enterprises develop 
in response to prevailing market imperfections in the urban 
areas: for example, through surreptitious entry into an 
oligopolistic market, the informal entrepreneur is often 
able to supply additional units of the same or similar good 
or service at a comparatively low price; and similarly, by 
ignoring existing minimum wage legislation , the same entrepre-
neur may be able to employ available labour at a comparatively 
low wage. Whatever its legal status may be, the fact is that 
the urban informal sector" ... attacks poverty di rectly by 
creating new sources of income and producing goods and 
serv ices at low cost where they a re needed most" .38 
Informal sector activities play an important role in 
determining output and employment conditions in the urban sector 
generally. Referring to Figure 3.6, for example, assume that the 
rural sector, X, again produces at E using 0xB capital and 0xA 
labour units. Output in the urban sector , Y, first expands 
along the path DyE , resulting in employment of 0yJ capital and 
0yW labour units, assume at a "formal" or institutional wage 
given by the slope of price line ww' . The accompanying decrease 
in uy (or increase in Ay) encourages (additional) labour to 
migrate from sector X to sector Y, all of whom are now assumed 
to become employed in a newl y emerging urban informal (sub-) 
sector, assume at a competitive wage which is below the 
in stitutional one. According to the Todaro model, t he emergence 
93. 
37. Altho ugh thi s i s not u sually reflec t ed in offi c ial statistic s. 
38. Truu a nd Black (1980 , p. 13) . 
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of such an urban sub-sector may itself affect the migration 
decision of prospective migrants in the rural areas. There are 
two possibilities here. Firstly, if prospective migrants regard 
the informal sector as a potentially permanent work destination, 
then the growth of informal job opportunities may well lower u 
x 
and raise Ay again , inducing yet more labour to migrate from 
sector X to sector Y; but the resultant increase in urban labour 
supply should also reduce the urban informal wage, and hence the 
average urban wage (wyl too, thus eventually bringing migration 
to an end when, say, MA = WZ labour units have left sector X to 
join the urban informal sector. 
Secondly, if the informal sector is regarded simply as a 
temporary transit to better paid jobs in the rest of sector Y, 
then its effect on migration is essentially the same as that 
of a pool of unemployed or underemployed urban dwellers; that 
is, the prospective migrant views the urban informal sector 
merely as a manifestation of unemployment ---- albeit a relatively 
gainful one ---- and continues to regard the insti tutiona1 urban 
wage and re1ated job probability in the modern or formal sector 
as the only relevant determinants of migration. Accordingly, 
migration will proceed until uy has increased sufficiently to 
reduce Ay to its original level; assume, for example, that 
this also occurs at G, that is, when MA = WZ labour units 
have migrated from sector X to sector Y. 
In each of the above cases, the output and employment effects 
work in the same general direction. In Figure 3.6, suppose that 
production functions are identical in informal enterprises and the 
95. 
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rest of sector Y, but that the former use more labour relative 
to capital due to the corresponding wage differential. The net 
result is then that the decrease in the average urban wage, wy, 
also lowers the average capital/labour ratio in sector Y, enabling 
it to produce at a point such as G, representing production of 
the composite output level Y 6 by means of 0" J capita I and 0 Z Y .Y 
labour units. This means that the growth of informal sector 
activities effectively lowers the amount of capital investment 
needed to achieve full employment in the economy as a whole, 
e.g. 0y J compared to 0yJ capital units in Figure 3.6; indeed, 
the effect is similar to that of a labour subsidy in the sense 
that they "get the prices right, ',' or at least lessen the relative 
importance of factor price distortions in the urban sector as a 
whole. 
5. General Policy Implications 
The analysis thus far has focused on the attainment of full 
employment through a net increase in the capital stock. For 
policy purposes, however, it is important also to consider the 
means by which existing supplies of capital and labour can be used 
to overcome the adverse employment effects of market imperfections. 
It seems therefore worthwhile to assess the general desirability 
of using indirect taxes and subsidies for ' this purpose; or more 
precisely, of using the particular tax-subsity combinations 
suggested by both the Todaro hypothesis and the above analysis 
of the urban informal sector. 
97. 
To begin with, let us consider the following general case of 
themarket imperfections hypothesis. Suppose that variations 
in the prices of capital and labour are institutionally constrained 
by given maximum and minimum values respectively, in both the 
urban and rural sectors of a typical developing economy. It 
seems reasonable also to assume that the maximum price of 
capital in the rural sector, X, exceeds that in sector V,39 
while the minimum wage in sector V again exceeds that in 
sector X. This is illustrated with the aid of Figure 3.7(a), 
where the solid line O~R' depicts the locus of price lines 
for which the price of capital in sector X is at a maximum and 
the wage at a minimum; and similarly O;S' gives the locus of 
sector V's price lines for which the corresponding price 
of capital is at a maximum and the wage at a minimum. The 
difference in the slope between O~R' and O;S' is due to the 
abovementioned differences in these maxima and minima. Since 
this implies that the slope of the price line in each sector is 
only permitted to increase with respect to price lines along O'R' 
x 
and O;S' respectiveiy, it follows 
the feasible (economic) region of 
that the area O'C' O'R' x y 
product i on for sector X, 
represents 
whi Ie 
O;CS' is the corresponding region for sector Y. Similarly, the 
"effeciency locus" or path of maximum total output, is given 
by the line segments O~H' cum S'H' and H'Oy' which may now be 
used to trace out the corresponding (constrained) tran sforma -
tion curve. This is shown as the curve SHOy in Figure 3.7(b), 
where the segments SH and HOy correspond to the similarly 
lettered portions of the efficiency locus in Figure 3.7(a). 
39. Although the price of capital tends to be relatively under-
priced in both the rural and urban sectors (Todaro (1971 )), it is 
nevertheless higher in the rural sector (Chenery et al. (1974)). 
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Output combinations along HOy represent full employment in the 
economy as a whole, while the output combinations given by SH 
indicate labour unemployment. 
Referring back to Figure 3.7(a), suppose that production in 
sectors X and Y occurs at E' and F', respectively, indicating 
labour unemployment equal to A'D ' or X'I' units. These input 
ratios correspond to the equilibrium output ratio a in Figure 
3.7(b), where the community indifference curve labelled W1 is 
tangent to the commodity price line P1 P1'. The slope of P1 P1' . 
is evidently less than that of the constrained transformation 
curve, SHOy' which indicates simply that the wage (and interest) 
differential is assumed to be "working against" sector V.40 
The solution to this unemployment problem may, of course, 
include virtually any output combination along the contract 
curve, O~Oy in Figure 3.7(a). But it nevertheless seems 
reasonable to assume that a policy aimed at expanding output 
of both commodities would be deemed preferable to one involving 
a decrease in either of the two commodities. Such a policy 
should allow production of X and Y to move to a desired output 
combination on the contract curve, anywhere between the pOints 
where the latter curve intersects the respective isoquants, X3 
and Y1; e.g. the combination at point ~', where the respective 
marginal rates of technical substitution of labour for capital 
are equal . The net effect would then be a movement from a on 
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40. See, for example, Hagen (1958), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), 
Johnson (1965), Battra and Pattanaik (1970), Batra (1973, ch. 10) 
and Hazari (1978, Parts 1 and 2) . 
the constrained transformation curve, to ~ on the true trans-
formation curve in Figure 3.7(b), which ceteris paribus implies 
achievement of the higher level of social welfare associated 
with indifference curve W2. 
The desired increase in sector Y's output clearly requires 
the use of a labour subsidy and/or capital tax - the effect 
of which would be broadly similar to that of promoting informal 
sector activities at the expense of production in the rest of 
sector Y. In the absence of a cost constraint, the labour 
subsidy (or capital tax) would not only lower the price of 
labour relative to that of capital, but would also, given. 
variable technical coefficients of production, enable sector 
Y to expand production through the use of relatively labour-
intensive techniques. Since the actual wage accuring to the 
employee is unlikely to be affected by the subsidy itself, 
employment growth in sector Y may well raise the probabitity 
of obtaining employment (Ay)' and hence encourage (potentially 
unemployed) labour to migrate from sector X to sector Y. 
According to Todaro's model, the only way to prevent such 
migration would be to raise the actual wage in sector X 
sufficiently so as to counteract the rising Ay.
41 
Moreover, the increase in the rural wage rate would almost 
certainly have to be supplemented by an appropriate factor tax-
subsidy mix: for example, if the required wage increase were 
such as to raise the slope of sector X's price line above that 
100. 
41. Assuming, of course, that a decrease in the urban wage rate 
is not permitted. 
given by tt' --- in which case production of X would occur 
somewhere to the left of e' --- then a labour subsidy and/or 
capital tax would be needed to bring production of X back to 
the optimal input combination at e'; or alternatively, if the 
effect of the wage increase were to raise the slope of sector 
101. 
X's price line to below that of tt', then the appropriate policy 
measure would be a labour tax and/or capital subsidy. It thus 
appears that the size and composition of the optimal factor tax-
subsidy package in each sector depends on (i) the desired increase 
in the rural relative to urban sector's output, and (ii) the extent 
to which the rural wage rate would have to rise in order to remove 
the (Tbdarian) migration incentive. 
Consequently, if Figure 3.7 does indeed represent an approxima-
tion of conditions in developing countries, then it follows that 
there are at least two conditions for eliminating unemployment in 
the face of a capital constraint. The first and necessary 
condition is an increase in output in both the rural and urban 
sectors, by means of factor rather than product subsidies or 
taxes --- which seems consistent with the proven superiority of 
a factor subsidy over both a product subsidy and tariff in the 
elimination of international trade disequilibria arising from 
factor price distortions. 42 But the sufficient condition is 
rather less conventional, in that it entails an increase in the 
rural wage rate sufficient to offset the relatively high probability 
of obtaining employment in the urban sector. 
42 . See Chapter 4 below. 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND POLICY 
1. Introduction: The Gains from Trade 
The basic reason why countries are said to engage in inter-
national trade is that it enables them to consume more than they 
can actually produce with their given resource endowments. This 
statement is, of course, a direct corollary to the Ricardian -
102. 
theory of comparative advantage. 1 According to Ricardo, a country 
stands to gain if it specializes in producing those commodities in 
which it has a so-called comparative cost advantage, and exchange 
them internationally for commodities in which it has a comparative 
disadvantage. If all countries were to produce and trade in this 
manner, the value of world production and consumption would be 
higher than it would be in the absence of international trade. 
In a.two-country, two-good world, for example, suppose 
country A has a comparative advantage with respect to good X 
insofar as she can produce it relatively more cheaply than 
country B; that is, country A foregoes fewer units of good Y 
in order to produce one unit of X, than does country B. Now, 
if country B has a comparative advantage in the production of 
good Y, then it follows that country A can get more of Y in 
exchange for X internationally than she can do at home. Compared 
to the pre-trade situation, this means that free trade will bring 
1 . A good summary of the theory is provided by S6dersten 
(1970, ch.1). 
about an increase in the relative price of good X to country 
A, while at the same time raising the relative price of good 
Y for country B. Accordingly, if country A exports good X 
and imports good Y from country B, then both countries benefit 
in that each will be able to obtain the other's good more 
cheaply than if these were produced domestically: " ... the 
gain from trade is the difference between the value of things 
that are got and the value of things that are given up".2 
The static gains from trade may be illustrated with the 
aid of Figure 4.'. The non-trade or autarkic equilibrium in 
country A occurs at pOint E, where the community indifference 
curve labelled W, is tangent both to the transformation curve 
TT', and to the domestic price line dId, '. The international 
or external terms of trade are in turn given by price line 
f,f,', indicating a higher relative price for good X on the 
international market. The (domestic) production pOint 
accordingly moves from E to F along TT', where the marginal 
rate of product transformation is equal to the corresponding 
international price ratio - given by the slope of f,f,'. 
The country may now export AF units of good X in exchange 
for AG units of good Y, and thus consume at pOint G where 
the community indifference curve labelled W2 is tangent to 
price line f,f, '. While Pareto optimality is assured by the 
fact that the community marginal rate of substitution equals 
the marginal rate of product transformation, it is clear that 
2 . Hicks (1959, p. 181 l. 
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specialization and free trade have enabled the country to 
achieve a higher level of social welfare than enjoyed previously; 
as indicated by W2 versus W1. 
Turning now to the dynamic gains from trade, it is perhaps 
worth noting that these too had been first recognised and 
considered at some length by the classical economists. 3 More 
recently, Myint (1954-55; 1958; 1968), Haberler (1959) and 
other.s4 have argued that the "indirect" or dynamic benefits 
from trade may be at least as important as the static gains 
highlighted in the traditional theory of comparative advantage: 
"If we were to estimate the contribution of international trade 
to economic development, especially of the underdeveloped 
economies, solely by the static gains from trade in any given 
year on the usual assumption of given production capabilities, 
we would indeed grossly underrate the importance of trade".5 
The chief dynamic gain from trade is the increase in the 
size of the total market available to a trading country's 
producers. The discovery and subsequent utilization of new 
export markets generally give rise to economies of scale, an 
inflow of capital and other productive resources and the 
international dissemination of technical knowledge. Such 
benefits amount to an increase in the physical quantity and/or 
producti vity of resources used in the production of both 
exports and import-com!)eting commodities; or as Haberler (1959, p.108) 
3. Smith (1953, p. 413), Mill (1965, p. 581). See also Myint (1958). 
4. See Hicks (1953); Cairncross (1960; 1962) and Nurske (1961). 
5. Haberler (1959, p. 108) . 
puts it, the dynamic gains from trade represent "an outward 
sh i ft of the production poss i bi li ty curve brought about by 
a trade-induced movement along the curve". However, if the 
value of the country's trade is large in relation to that of 
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its trading partners, then the increased supply of its exports, 
coupled with the increased demand for imported commodities, 
could raise the relative prices of its imports on the inter-
national market6; and to the extent that this happens, the 
resulting deterioration of its terms of trade should at least 
partly offset the dynamic gains from trade. 
All this may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 4.2. 
Domestic production and consumption initially occur at pOints 
F and G, respectively, indicating equality between the 
community marginal rate of substitution, the marginal rate 
of product transformation and the international price ratio 
as given by the slope of price line f1f1 '. Suppose now that 
trade induces export-biased growth? resulting specifically 
from (i) an increase in the supplies of capital and labour, 
and (ii) (neutral) technological progress in the export 
sector, X. Such a situation is shown by the non-parallel, 
outward shift of the transformation curve from TT' to ss:8 
If the international terms of trade remain unchanged, the 
production point will move from F to H, and the consumption 
point from G to I, with the social indifference curve 
labelled W3 tangent to the internation.3l price line f / 2' 
6 . The effect of internat i onal trade on the terms of trade 
was first recognised by several English economists during the 
previous century. (See S6dersten, (1970, pp. 184-190». 
7. See , for example, Ca ve s and Jones (1973, chs 25 and 26). 
8. On the nature of t h is s h i ft, s ee Krauss and Johnson (1974 
and Saldry (1980, ch. 6) . 
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(parallel to f1f1 I) . Under the large-country assumption 
made above, it is possible that the (trade-induced) growth 
could cause an increase in the relative price of the imported 
commod i ty Y - ill ustrated here by the i nd i fference between 
the slope of the new price line, g1 g1', and the slope of f 2f 2'. 
Although the latter change in the terms of trade, ceteris 
paribus, lowers the level of social welfare (for example, from 
W3 to W2), the net effect is nevertheless an increase in the 
welfare level from W1 to W2. 
The question naturally arises whether the welfare effect 
of the thus deteriorating terms of trade could in fact outweigh 
the dynamic (welfare) gain from trade; that is, whether the 
deteriorating terms of trade could bring about a net decrease 
in the social welfare level. This possibility has been 
frequently raised in the context of developing countries, for 
example by such writers as Singer (1950), Prebisch (1950; 1959), 
Viner (1953), Myint (1954-55) and Myrdal (1956), and in 
Bhagwati's (1958) rather elegant interpretation of "immiserizing 
growth". In what follows, therefore, we shall consider the 
various reasons and policy proposals put forward for the 
alleged deterioration of the developing countries' terms of 
trade. 
2. The Prebisch-Singer Thesis. 9 
Prebisch divides the world into industrial or developed 
'centres' which generally specialize in the production of 
manufactures; and' peri pheral,' or deve loping countries 
9. See Baer (1962) and Flanders (1964) . 
specializing in the production of agricultural and other 
primary commodities. His main contention is that during 
most of the past 100 years the terms of trade have turned 
in favour of centre countries and against the periphery: 
" .... the price relation turned steadily against primary 
production from the 1870' s until the Second World War".l0 
Prebisch bases his explanation" for the periphery's deterior-
ating terms of trade on two critically important assumptions, 
namely, (i) while the income elasticity of the periphery's 
demand for the exports of the centre exceeds unity, the 
corresponding .elasticity of the centre's demand for the 
periphery's exports is again significantly smaller than one; 
and (ii) the commodity and factor markets in the centre are 
generally characterized by imperfect competition, while those 
in the periphery tend to approximate perfect competition. 
The process begins with a given technological innovation 
giving rise to productivity increases in the export sectors 
of both the centre and the periphery countries. Under 
competitive market conditions, such productivity increases 
are likely to be accompanied by corresponding price reductions 
which occur as a result of new firms entering the relevant 
product markets; similarly, if the rate of productivity growth 
is the same everywhere, the "benefits of technological 
progress (will) tend to be distribu1:td alike over the whole 
community" . 11 But since productivity gains in the centre have 
1 0 " Prebisch (1950, p . 8). 
11. Prebi s ch (195 0, p . 1). 
109. 
in fact been much larger than those in the periPhery,12 the 
latter reasoning would lead one to expect that the terms of 
trade should have turned in favour of the peripheral countries. 
This has evidently not happened. 13 As Prebisch and Singer 
see it, the main reason for the periphery's declining terms 
of trade should be sought in the imperfectly competitive 
nature of the centre's product and factor markets. Any given 
productivity increase in the centre will either encourage 
trade unions to bid up wages in an attempt to raise the real 
income of labour; or alternatively, if trade unions are 
unable to enforce such wage increases, prices are unlikely 
to fall in view of the imperfectly competitive structure of 
the product markets. Likewise, the relatively high income 
elasticity of the periphery's demand for the centre's exports 
is bound to put a further upward pressure on the latter's 
export prices, or at least prevent them from falling. 
110. 
As far as the peripheral countries are concerned, productivity 
increases tend to be matched by corresponding price reductions. 
Since technological innovations in the periphery often entail 
a large-scale substitution of capital for labour, Prebisch 
maintains that the level of labour employment may actually 
fall in the absence of a sufficfently large increase in 
aggregate output, thus lowering wages or at least leaving 
them unchanged at subsistence level. Any profits thus made 
will, however, soon disappear as prices are bid down by new 
12. See, for example, Singer (1950). 
13. See Kindleberger (1958), Meier (1958), UN (1975) and 
Coleman and Nixson (1978, p. 92). For evidence to the contrary, 
see Haberler (1959) and 8airoch (1975, pp. 112-113). 
firms entering the product markets of the periphery. · Similarly, 
this downward trend in prices will be reinforced generally by 
the fact that the income elasticity of the centre's demand 
for peripheral exports is relatively smal J. It therefore 
follows that while the periphery's export prices tend to 
fall in the face of given increases in productivity, those 
of the centre remain unchanged and may even rise: as Prebisch 
puts it, " ... the great industrial centres not only keep for 
themselves the benefit of the use of new techniques in their 
own economy, but are in a favourable position to obtain a 
share of that deriving from the technical progress of the 
periphery" .14 
A diagrammatic illustration of the Prebisch-Singer thesis 
is provided by Bhagwati's (1958) notion of immiserizing growth. 
In Figure 4.3, for example, we reproduce the growth-induced, 
outward shift of the transformation curve shown in Figure 4.2. 
For reasons discussed earlier, suppose the latter shift is 
accompanied by a relatively large increase in the relative 
price of the imported commodity, Y, for example to the level 
given by the slope of the new international price line h1h1'. 
Production accordingly adjusts to pOint U while, at the new 
terms of trade, consumption occurs at pOint V. But since U 
represents a lower level of social welfare then the original, 
pre-growth equilibrium at G, it follows that the country has 
been made worse off by the growth-induced decline in its terms 
of trade: "Economic expansion increases output which, however, 
14. Prebisch (1950, p. 14). 
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might lead to a sufficient deterioration in the terms of trade 
to offset the beneficial effect of expansion and reduce the 
reaL income of the growing country" .15 
It is, finally, possiJle to extend the above analysis 
by considering two recent studies undertaken by Bhagwati and 
Brecher (1980) and Brecher and Choudhri (1980). These authors 
contend that the dynamic gains from trade would be limited ---
or the welfare loss increased --- if capital investment were 
undertaken by foreigners who received the whole or a part of 
the value of the marginal product of capital. For this 
113. 
purpose, it would be necessary to distinguish between an 
'aggregate' and a 'national' transformation curve (and budget 
line), where the former refers to the total value of production, 
and the latter to the total value net of the returns accruing 
to foreign-owned capital. In terms of Figure 4.3, for example, 
the appropriate 'national' transformation curve and price line 
would lie somewhere to the left of 55' and hlhl' respectively, 
thus further lowering the welfare level obtainable under 
conditions of immise~ i z ing growth. The latter conclusion seems 
at least consistent with Singer's (1950) view that foreign 
investment convey very few benefits to developing countries 
on the whole, and may even make them worse off via a deterior-
ation in their terms of trade. 
Prebisch and Singer are perhaps best known generally for 
their respective policy proposals. Prebisch in particular 
advocates a policy of tariff protection coupled with selective 
1 5. Bha gwati ( 19 58 , p . 325 ). 
export promotion, as a means of arresting the periphery's 
declining terms of trade, and possibly even of improving 
them over time, Singer in turn invokes the classical infant-
industry argument by emphasizing the dynamic benefits that 
can be gained from a policy of tariff protection. Since these 
policy measures have evoked much lively discussion in the 
literature lately, it seems worth analyzing them here 
explicitly. 
3. Tariff Protection and the Terms of Trade 
The terms of trade (or "optimum tariff") 16 argument for 
protection depends on whether the tariff is likely to turn the 
international terms of trade in favour of the tariff-levying 
country.17 If the country is, for example, too "small'! to 
affect world prices, then the domestic price of its imports 
will rise by the full amount of the tariff, in which case the 
country is bound to experience a deteriorating welfare position. 
This may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 4.4 below, where 
the initial production and consumption equilibria are shown at 
pOints F and G, respectively. Suppose a tariff is now levied 
on the imported commodity, Y, so that its relative price 
increases from that given by the slope of the international 
price line f 1f 1', to that given by the slope of the (domestic) 
price line, d1d1'. Given maximizing behaviour on the part of 
producers and consumers alike, the former will respond by 
16. Scitovsky (1942). 
17. See Metzler (1949), S6dersten and Vind (196B) and Johnson 
(1964). Good summaries of the literature can be found in Corden 
(1971) and Caves and Jones (1973, ch. 12), 
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producing more of good Y relative to X, while the latter 
will again consume more of good X relative to Y, thus 
establishing new equilibria at pOints H and I, respectively; 
that is, the economy will now be exporting AH units of good 
X in exchange for AI units of good Y. At the tariff-
inc1usive price of good Y, consumers will exchange AH units 
of good X for AB units of Y, leaving the remaining quantity 
of BI units to be collected by the government in the form 
of tax revenue. If the latter amount is returned to 
consumers in the form of a lump-sum payment for spending 
purposes, however, consumption will occur at pOint I, where 
the community indifference curve labelled W1 is both tangent 
to the domestic price line d2d2' (parallel to d1d1 '), and 
intersects the international price line, fl2 '. 
This example illustrates how the imposition of a tariff 
could distort the international economy: although both the 
community marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate 
of product transformation are equal to the domestic price 
ratio, the latter is nevertheless less than the internationa1 
price ratio - gi yen here by the slope of price line f 2f 2' . 
This distortional effect is further reflected in the fact 
that the new equilibrium at pOint I represents a lower 
welfare level than the initial, free-trade equilibrium at 
G. It is important to note, however, that the latter 
welfare loss is due partly to the small-country assumption 
made at the outset: " ... the optimal tariff is zero if the 
terms of trade cannot be altered" .18 
18. Caves and Jones (1973, p. 537). 
116. 
The situation will be different if the value of the 
tariff-levying country's trade is large relative to that 
of the rest of the world. Here it would at least be 
possible for the country to improve its terms of trade, 
and to achieve a welfare gain, via an appropriate policy 
of tariff protection. In Figure 4.5 below, for example, 
we reproduce the initial free-trade equilibria shown in 
Figure 4.4: domestic production and consumption occur 
at the respective pOints F and G along the international 
price line, f1f1" indicating attainment of the social 
welfare level, W2• The immediate effect of the imposition 
of a tariff, ceteris paribus, is to raise the relative 
price of the imported commodity Y. Suppose, however, that 
the accompanying decrease in the country's import demand 
is sufficient to lower the internationa~ price of good Y 
to the level given by the new~y established international 
price line g1 g1'. The latter price decrease impl ies, of 
course, a correspondingly lower tariff-inclusive domestic 
price of good Y --- shown here by the slope of. the 
parallel price lines, e1e1' and e2e2'. The consumption 
equilibrium point accordingly moves from G to M on the 
new international price line g1 g1', where the community 
indifference curve labelled W3 is tangent to the domestic 
price line, e2e2'. But since point M represents a higher 
welfare level than the initial position at G, it follows 
that the tariff has indeed made the country better off 
than before; in short, the tariff-induced improvement in 
the terms of trade has more than offset the distortional 
effect of the tariff itself. 
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It is probably fair to say that Prebisch based his 
argument for tariff protection on the large-country 
assumption made in the previous paragraph: throughout 
his two major works, for example, he implicitly assumed 
the existence of a two-country world consisting of one 
centre and one peripheral country. But even if the 
peripheral country did act as a monopolist with respect 
to the centre, it seems doubtful indeed whether a uniform 
policy of tariff protection would enable the periphery to 
improve its terms of trade to any significant extent. The 
fact of the matter is that the value of peripheral imports 
from the centre constitutes but a negligibly small proportion 
of the value of total output of the centre countries: " 
the centre's biggest customer is itself, not the periphery".19 
Moreover, export prices in the centre are unlikely to fall in 
response to a significant decrease in demand, in view of the 
abovementioned downward inflexibility of prices and wages in 
the centre's product and factor markets; June Flanders (1964, 
p. 302) puts is succinctly: " •.. a downward shift in the 
periphery's demand function for centre exports will result 
in making the centre worse off, through unemployment, without 
making the periphery better off through an improvement in the 
terms of trade" . 
119. 
19. Flanders (1964, p. 301). See also Thirlwall (1974, p. 278). 
'20. 
4. The Infant-Industry Argument for Protection20 
Tariff policies in developing countries generally attempt 
to protect domestic infant industries against foreign competition, 
with a view to creating more job opportunities for a growing 
population. The infant-industry case for protection is thus 
largely a dynamic one and, as such, similar to the dynamic 
argument for free trade; specifically, a tariff-induced increase 
in the (domestic) production of importables usually gives rise 
to an inflow of capital, technical know-how and other resources, 
while at the same time enabling domestic producers to reap the 
benefits of various internal and external economies of scale. 
This situation may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 4.6 
below, where the initial production and consumption equilibria 
are shown at pOints F and G, respectively. The imposition of a 
tariff on good Y, ceteris paribus, raises its relative price 
to that given by the slope of the tariff-inclusive domestic 
price line, d,d, '; and as before, the production and consumption 
pOints move to H and I respectively, indicating a decrease in 
the level of social welfare from W2 to WOo 
Now, it is possible to show that the latter welfare loss 
may be more than offset by growth-induced increases in the 
level of real income. Suppose, for example, the dynamic 
gains from protection are biased in favour of the import-
competing good, Y, so that the transformation curve undergoes 
20. See, for example, Singer (1950), Myint (1963), S6dersten 
(1970, ch. 21) and Corden (1974). In addition, Colman and Nixson 
(1978, ch. 8) provide a useful summary of the nature and general 
economic consequences of lIimport-substitutingtl strategies in 
various developing countries. 
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a non-parallel, outward shift from TT' to 55'. If the country 
now removed the tariff altogether without affecting the 
international terms of trade, it would produce at pOint J 
and consume at M, thus attaining the higher welfare level 
gi ven by W3. 
Whether the dynamic gains from tariff protection will 
exceed the corresponding gains from free trade is, of course, 
. . . 21 
an open question. But even if it did, this would not in 
itself provide a justification for tariff protection. It is 
generally agreed that while the same objective(s) could be 
achieved through the use of domestic subsidies and taxes, 
such policies would nevertheless entail a smaller sacrifice 
in terms of real income foregone, than would a policy of 
tariff protection. 22 Suppose, for example, the government 
believed that a given increase in the domestic production 
of importables is justified on account of the dynamic 
benefits associated with such an expansion. 23 Specifically, 
let the desired level of production be AH units of good Y 
in Figure 4.6. We have already shown that the imposition 
of a tariff on good Y could shift resources from the initial, 
free-trade equilibrium, F, to the desired allocation at point 
H. Alternatively, the government could subsidize the domestic 
122. 
21 . This would depend on the size and nature of the respective 
dynamic benefits, as well as on the size of the country's trade 
relative to that of the rest of the world . 
22 . See Corden (1957), Johnson (1965) and Bhagwat i (1971). 
23. Notwithstanding, that is, the short term loss of welfare. 
production of good Y, and/or tax that of good X, in Order 
to effect the same movement of the (equilibrium) production 
point along the transformation curve, TT'. The difference 
is simply that consumers would now be allowed to purchase 
commodities at existing world prices, indicated here by the 
slope of the international price line, f3f3'; similarly, the 
new consumption equilibrium would occur at pOint N, where 
the community indifference curve labelled W1 is tangent to 
price line f3f3" Consequently, while the dynamic benefits 
would presumably be the same for both policies, it is clear 
that the welfare loss resulting from the tax-cum-subsidy on 
domestic production is smaller than the corresponding loss 
associated with tariff protection. 
5. Market Imperfections and Trade POlicy24 
123. 
An import tariff is not the only type of distortion affecting 
the international trade relations between countries. There are 
many others too that may drive a wedge between a commodity price and 
its marginal social cost of production, and/or the corresponding 
marginal social benefit. Perhaps the most common of these are 
external economies arising from the interdependencies of 
con sumption, production and investment decisions, the existence 
of monopolis t ic and oligopoli sti c markets and various policies 
of wage determination. In all such cases domestic prices do 
not as a rule reflect their true marginal cost of transformation 
in production. 
24 . See Haberler (1950) a nd Hage n (1 958). More r e c e nt c ontr ibutions 
inc l u d e Bhagwat i a nd Ramaswam i ( 1963) , J ohnson (1965), Battra and 
Pat tanaik (19 70), Battra (1 9 73 , c h s 10 and 11) and Hazari (1978) . 
From a development pOint of view, it is interesting to 
compare the various policy options open to the government when 
faced with ·a monopolist controlling the industry in which the 
country has a comparative advantage. There are essentially 
two possibilities here. The first is illustrated with the 
aid of Figure 4.7 below, which shows the situation for a 
small country specializing in the production of good X. If 
X is controlled by a monopolist while good Y is produced by 
one of a large number of small-sized competitors, the autarkic 
equilibrium will occur at a pOint such as E, where the community 
indifference curve labelled W1 is tangent to the domestic price 
line, d1d1 '; the fact that the community marginal rate of 
substitution exceeds the marginal rate of product transforma-
tion, indicates simply that the domestic price of good X is 
higher than its marginal cost of production. Notwithstanding 
the latter discrepancy, we assume here that good X is relatively 
more expensive on the international market than it is at home ---
illustrated, for example, by the difference between the slope 
of the international price line, f 1f 1', and the slope of 
price line d1d1'. This implies that under free trade domestic 
production will adjust to a point such as F on the transforma-
tion curve TT', and consumption to pOint G, thus enabling the 
economy to attain the higher level of social welfare W2. 
Although free trade is evidently deemed preferable to 
autarky in the example represented by Figure 4.7, the former 
. nevertheless represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources 
due to the continued existence of monopolistic conditions in 
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industry X. Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) have shown that 
the optimal policy here would be a tax-cum-subSidy aimed 
directly at the source of the distortion, namely domestic 
production: specifically a subsidy on good X (and/or tax 
on good Y) could move the equilibrium production pOint from 
F to H along the transformation curve TT', and the correspon-
ding consumption pOint from G to I, and thus eliminate the 
divergence between the marginal rate of product transformation 
and the corresponding international price ratio. Such a 
policy would thus enable the economy to _achieve the highest 
welfare level shown in Figure 4.7, namely W3. 
The second possibility referred to above was raised by 
Gottfried Haberler in a celebrated article which appeared in 
the Economic Journa! in 1950. He proved that -autarky could 
yield a better solution than free trade if domestic prices 
were significant!y different from their respective marginal 
(social) costs of production. This situation is shown in 
Figure 4.8. The initial equilibrium under autarky occurs at 
point E on the transformation curve, TT', indicating a 
relatively substantial divergence between the community 
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of 
product transformation for good X. If the magnitude of the 
distortion is such as to raise the relative domestic price 
of good X above its corresponding international level, then 
free trade will cause the production point to move from E to 
126. 
M, and the consumption pOint from E to N, where the indifference 
curve labelled Wo is tangent to the international price line, 
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f1f1 '. The free trade solution is thus deemed inferior to the 
autarkic equilibrium. 
The above example illustrates how free trade could 
aggravate the effect of the domestic distortion by encouraging 
a shift of resources away from the industry in which the 
comparative advantage lies; in point of fact, at the free-
trade equilibria given by pOints M and N, the country would 
be exporting good Y instead of good X. Although an appropriate 
policy of tariff protection could give rise to a welfare 
improvement, the optimal policy again entails a tax-cum-subsidy 
on domestic production.25 Such a policy would eliminate the 
effect of the distortion entirely, by shifting resources from 
point E to point P along the transformation curve, thus 
enabling the economy to maximize welfare at the output mix, Q. 
Turning, finally, to the policy implications of factor 
'market imperfections in an open economy, consider the situation 
set out in Figure 4.9. The constrained transformation curve, 
SAT', is similar to that shown in Figure 3.7(b): it embodies 
the fact that while production is constrained by the existence 
128. 
of minimum wage rates throughout the economy, the minimum wage 
is nevertheless higher in sector Y than in sector X. The latter 
discrepancy also accounts for the fact that at the initial 
autarkic equilibrium, E, the marginal rate of product trans-
formation exceeds the slope of the domestic price line, d1d1, .26 
25. See Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963). 
26. It will be recalled that point E represents a situation 
of labour unemployment in the economy as a whole . (See chapter 
3, section 5). 
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Suppose now that free trade raises the relative price of 
good X to that given by the slope of the international price 
line, f 1f 1'. Domestic production accordingly adjusts to 
point Q, and consumption to point R, thus indicating attain-
ment of the higher level of social welfare, W2.
27 
The fact that the free trade solution is not necessarily 
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superior to autarky in the presence of factor price distortions, 
need not concern us here :28 the general policy implications 
are the same irrespective of whether free trade is preferred 
to autarky. A tax-cum-subsidy on domestic production, for 
example, would be preferable to free trade if it caused a 
shift of resources to, say, point A on the constrained trans-
formation curve, in which case the new consumption pOint 
would presumably lie somewhere to the northeast of point R. 
But such a policy would be sub-optimal insofar as it would 
not be directed at the source of the domestic distortion, 
namely the labour market. 
What is needed here is a policy of tax-cum-subSidy on 
factor use that would enable the economy to produce along 
its true transformation curve, TT' --- for example, at point 
V where the marginal rate of product transformation equals 
the slope of the international price line, f 2f2 '. The economy 
would then maximize welfare by consuming at point .Z, indicating 
equality between the community marginal rate of substitution, 
the marginal rate of product transformation and the correspon-
ding international price ratio. 
27 . For similar analyses, see the references listed in f ootnote 
24 above. 
28. It can be shown that if (i) the wage differential "worked 
against" sector X instead of sector Y, and (ii) the slope value of 
the domestic price line exceeded that of the international price 
More generally, there can be little doubt that the 
above analysis is particularly relevant to developing 
countries whose product and/or factor markets are character-
ized by various price distortions. Our chief conclusion is 
simply that for a small country at least, free trade is 
generally superior to a policy of tariff protection. In 
the presence of domestic price distortions, however, both 
tariff protection and free trade compare unfavourably with 
domestic subsidies and taxes aimed specifically at the source 
of the distortion, whether it be the product or the labour 
market. It is indeed worth quoting Meier's (1976, p. 652) 
summary of the policy measures relevant to factor price 
distortions: 
"The difficulty with protection by a tariff is that 
it .seeks to remedy the distortion by affecting foreign 
trade, whereas the distortion is in a domestic factor 
market. In this case, a policy of subsidization of 
production of the import-competing commodity, or of 
taxation of agricultural production, would be superior 
to a tariff. A policy of subsidization on the use of 
labour in the import-competing industry, or a tax on 
its use in agriculture, would be an even better 
solution; since it directly eliminates the wage 
differential, this policy yields a higher real 
income than can be attained by a tax-cum-subSidy 
on domestic production. A tariff on industrial 
imports is thus the least effective way of off-
setting a distortion in a labour market". 
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line, then the free trade equilibrium would be deemed inferior 
to that associated with autarky . (See also 8attra and Pattanaik 
(1970)). 
CHAPTER 5 
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have deliberately ignored the general 
effect of economic development on the personal distribution of 
income. This was done largely for expositional purposes. It 
132. 
could perhaps be argued that the various explanations put forward 
for the emergence and continued existence of labour unemployment, 
did at least implicitly recognize the potentially inequitable 
consequences of particular development processes. 1 Nevertheless, 
in the two-sector model proper --- that is, in the absence of 
a government or any other redistributive institution --- an 
unemployed person could not earn any income and would, presumably, 
succumb to the traditional Malthusian constraint. 
The relationship between economic development and income 
distribution has attracted much attention in the recent litera-
ture. It came to light in the well-known study of the Kenyan 
economy by the International Labor Office (ILO, 1972), which 
was subsequently followed by several similar works, both of a 
theoretical and an empirical nature;2 indeed, from the point 
of view of development economics at least, the seventies may 
be considered the decade of "redistribution with growth".3 
1 • The terms "inequitable" and lIequitable" are used here in the 
general Pigovian sense: any given decrease in the share of real 
income accruing to the poor will, ceteris paribus, lead to a decrease 
in the level of social welfare. (See Pigou (1960, ch. 8». 
2. TWo recent surveys are Morawetz (1974) and Clinp- (1975). 
3. After Chenery et. aI . (1974). 
Contrary to the conventional (i.e. Kaldorian) wisdom, the ILO 
maintained that most developing countries were eith"er able to 
achieve the twin objectives of economic growth and an equitable 
(or more equal) distribution of income simultaneously, or that 
they could at least achieve the latter at a relatively small 
cost in terms of output foregone. This view has not gone un-
challenged, however, as several writers have found that for 
some countries at least, a redistribution of income in favour 
of the poor might well involve a significant trade-off in the 
growth of both output and employment.4 
In section 2 below we consider the ILO argument in the 
context of the two-sector models developed in the earlier 
chapters. Section 3 invokes the so-called demonstration effect 
in an attempt to show how changes in individual tastes could 
limit the employment potential of a policy of income redistribu-
tion. Finally, section 4 discusses the implications of income 
redistribution for economic growth. 
2. Income Redistribution and Employment: The ILO View 
Traditionally the distribution of income is held to be an 
important determinant of the sa vings ratio, and hence of the 
growth rate of the national income . In the market-oriented 
developing countries of today, however, income tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of rich people who 
either do not save significantly on a current basis, or use 
4. See footnote 2 above . 
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their savings for purposes other than domestic investment. 5 
In addition, the disposable income of the rich is spent mostly 
on imports and on goods produced domestically by means of 
relatively capital-intensive techniques. Thus it is argued 
that a redistribution of income from the rich to the poor 
would cause a substantial increase in the demand for those 
goods and services which have a relatively high labour content, 
and low capital and import contents. Such a change in the 
composition of demand would not only help to solve the problems 
of unemployment and balance of payments disequilibrium, but it 
would do so without necessarily reducing the growth rate of 
output in the economy. 
The basic idea behind "redistribution with growth" can be 
analyzed in terms of the two-sector approach adopted in the 
previous chapters. For this purpose it would seem appropriate 
either to invoke Eckaus's theory of the "factor-proportions 
problem", or to turn to the "market imperfections hypothesis" 
discussed in Chapter 3: in each case we were able to derive 
a transformation curve partly consisting of a labour-unemploy-
ment segment, along which each output combination corresponded 
to a different rate of labour unemployment. Although Eckaus's 
theory will be used below for expositional purposes only,6 it 
is perhaps worth noting that the conclusions of our analysis 
are generally applicable also to the market imperfections 
hypotheSiS. 
5. See, for example, ILO (1970). 
6. This enables us to avoid the assumption of differential 
wage rates embodied in the market imperfections hypothesis. 
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Consider, for example, Figure 5.1 which reproduces part 
of the information contained in Figure 2.5. The initial 
equilibrium is given by the output combination, E. Since 
point E lies · on segment TF of the transformation curve, it 
represents a situation of labour unemployment in the economy 
asa whole. Similarly, the fact that the commodity price 
line has the same slope as TF means that the optimal distribu-
tion point occurs at E' on the contract curve, 0aE.7 The 
community indifference curve labelled S1 represents a so-called 
SCitovsky curve (rather than a Bergson frontier) insofar as 
135. 
it depends in part on the distribution of income between two 
individuals, A and B:8 specifically, S1 corresponds to the 
particular distribution given by point E' on the contract curve, 
Let us now introduce a change in the personal distribution 
(or ownership) of the production factors, and hence in that of 
income. 9 Suppose income is redistributed from individual B to 
individual A, so that B now demands less of both X and Y while 
A in turn demands more of both. But since A has a stronger 
relative preference for good X than does B, the increase in 
A's demand for X will be greater than the decrease in B's 
demand for the same good; and similarly, the decrease in B's 
demand for good Y will exceed the increase in A's corresponding 
7. That is, price line ee" is parallel to TF . 
8. See Graaff (1957, ch. 3), Mishan (1960) and the references 
listed in Appendix 1. 
9. See Baldry (1980, pp. 103-105) . 
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demand. The net effect is thus an increase in the aggregate 
demand for good X, and a decrease in demand for Y, ceteris 
paribus, ra i sing the demand pr i ce of X re I at i ve to that of Y; 
that is, the redistribution of income gives rise to a rightward 
shift in the market demand function for good X, and a leftward 
shift in the demand function for Y. This may be illustrated 
diagrammatically with the aid of Figure 5.1. The redistribu-
tion of income causes a shift of the distribution point from 
E' to E", the effect of which is twofold : firstly, the 
increase in the demand price for X raises the slope of the 
relative price line from that associated with TF, to that 
given by the new (demand) price line, mm'; and secondly, it 
establishes a new 5citovsky curve 51' , which is tangent to 
mm' at pOint E. This implies that the new disequilibrium price 
ratio now exceeds the old equilibrium price ratio (given by the 
slope of TF); or put differently, the demand price ratio exceeds 
the (as yet unchanged) supply price ratio. Accordingly, the 
economy is now experiencing both an excess demand for good X 
and an excess supply of good Y. 
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Given the existence of competitive conditions in both 
markets, these discrepancies will lead to an increase in the 
quantity supplied of good X, and to a decrease in the quantity 
supplied of Y, thus reducing the newly established disequilibrium 
price ratio while at the same time raising the old equilibrium 
price ratio. These changes will continue until the two price 
ratios eventually meet at some intermediate pOint, e.g. F in 
Figure 5.1, where the new equilibrium price ratio is given by 
the slope of price line ff'. At point F the new Scitovsky 
curve, 52' is tangent both to the transformation curve and to 
price line ff'; and similarly, the corresponding distribution 
point occurs at F' on the new contract curve, OaF. Since pOint 
F also represents a situation of overall full employment, it 
follows that the redistribution of income from B to A has 
effectively removed the labour unemployment. 
The latter conclusion derives from the fact that income 
was redistributed in favour of the individual with the stronger 
relative preference for the more labour-intensive good. The 
subsequent increase in demand for the labour-intensive good, 
coupled with the decrease in demand for the capital-intensive 
good, accounted for the net increase in labour employment in 
the economy. 
3. Income Redistribution and the Demonstration Effect 
138. 
The previous example relied on a number of seemingly 
unrealistic assumptions. Apart from the generally static nature 
of the analysis, there may be no justification for the assumption 
that individual tastes would remain constant in the face of a 
policy of income redistribution. It is quite possible that 
individual tastes may change over time in accordance with 
Engel's well-known law, according to which the proportion of 
income spent on food and other such necessities tends to 
decline with increases in the level of individual income; in 
a critique of the notion of declining marginal income utility, 
for example, Musgrave (1959, p. 10:1) observed that, "rising 
needs develop with rising income". One possible explanation 
for this tendency is provided by the so-called demonstration 
effect, a concept used by Pigou (1960, pp. 89-92J., Duesenberry 
(1949) and others 10 in their analyses of the consumption 
behaviour of poor people. 11 According to these authors, the 
poor are generally subject to a demonstration effect insofar 
as they emulate, or try to emulate, the consumption habits of 
the rich. Should the income of the poor increase as a result 
of a policy of redistribution, for example, their spending 
pattern would be likely to change in such a way as to reflect 
more closely that of the rich. 
The demonstration effect has gained in importance recently 
due to the growth of international trade and the accompanying 
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improvements in communication and transportation networks within 
the developing countries and between the developed and developing 
countries. 12 These improvements have facilitated both the flow 
of information and the transportation of goods and services 
between the rich and poor regions of the world. Likewise, the 
expanding activities of multinational companies have brought 
about a "diffusion of the 'ideology' of the consuming society -
that is, the creation of international consumption habits and 
standards, through the product differentiation and advertising 
characteristic of oligopolistic industries, throughout the 
deve loped and underdeve loped wor I d" . 13 
10 . See, for example, Nurske (1953, ch. 3) and Meier and Baldwin 
(1963, pp. 308-310). 
11. Their main proposition was that the magnitude of household 
saving depends not on the absolute level of household income, but 
rather on the household income relative to that of other households. 
12. See Kindl e berger a nd Herrick (1977, pp. 136-1 37). 
13. Colman and Nixson (1978, p. 231). See also Barnet and MUller 
(1974). 
The emergence of a demonstration effect may limit the 
employment potential of a policy of income redistribution. 
Consider,for example, Figure 5.2 which reproduces the 
situation shown in Figure 5. 1: pOints F and F' represent 
the equilibrium obtained after income has been redistributed 
from B to A, on the assumption that individual tastes have 
remained unchanged. Suppose, however, that A is subject to 
a demonstration effect in the sense that his taste depends in 
part on B's consumption pattern; specifically, let the increase 
in A's income ceteris paribus raise his relative preference 
for good Y. Such a situation is shown in Figure 5.2 by the 
anti-clockwise rotation of A's indifference curves, for 
example from A2 to A2' along price line ffll passing through 
pOint F' . This implies, in turn, an increase in the aggregate 
demand for Y which, ceteris paribus, raises its demand price 
relative to that of good X - indicated, for example, by the 
difference between the slope of the new price line, nn', and 
that of the previous price line ff' at point F. Given overall 
competitive conditions, however, the resultant increase in the 
supply of good Y will reduce its temporarily prevailing 
(disequilibrium) price, until equilibrium is re-established 
at a pOint such as G. At G the indifference curve labelled 
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S3 is tangent to the new (equilibrium) price line, TF, which 
cOincides with the labour-unemployment segment of the tranforma-
tion curve; similarly, the corresponding (optimal) distribution 
pOint is given by G' on the new contract curve 0 G. Since pOint 
a 
G lies on the labour-unemployed segment of the transformation 
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curve, however, it follows that the demonstration effect 
generally, and the change in A's taste in particular, have 
effectively given rise to the emergence of labour unemployment 
in the economy. 
The above example illustrates that the existence of a 
demonstration effect may limit the employment potential of a 
policy of income redistribution. This would occur if the 
policy were accompanied by an increase in the income recipient's 
relative preference for the capital intensive good. Moreover, 
it is at least possible that the latter change in tastes could 
cause a net increase in the relative supply of the capital-
intensive good; and if initially the economy experienced 
labour unemployment, for example due to the existence of fixed 
factor proportions, the net effect of the pol icy would then be 
to increase the level of labour unemployment. Generally, it is 
clear that the policy-induced increase in demand for the 
capital-intensive good would, ceteris paribus, raise the 
quantity of capital needed to attain overall full employment 
in the economy. Such a conclusion would seem to contradict 
TC'rl"!:,) ' s ~1971 ::,. 396) (,,~d others ' ) rece~t r" j"!ct i on of th"! 
" . ... conventional wisdom of economic theory, which placed top 
priority on the rapid accumulation of capital as the key to 
successful economic progress". 
4. Income Redistribution and Economic Growth 
Turning now to the implications of income redistribution 
142. 
for economic growth, it would seem appropriate to relate Kaldor's 
(1955-6; 1960) theory of distribution to the fi xed-proportion s 
• 
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model outlined in Chapter 2. In contrast to the neoclassical 
theory of economic growth for, example, Kaldor assumes that the 
aggregate savings ratio in the economy depends on the distribu-
tion of income between capitalists and workers. He divides 
the national income (Y) into two components, namely, wages (W) 
and profits (P) which accrue to workers and capital ists 
respectively. While capitalists' savings are proportionately 
larger than those of workers, both savings propensities are 
assumed to be constant. We thus have the following set of 
equations: 
Y = W + P 
and 
where Sw and Sp represent aggregate savings out of wages and 
profits ,respectively, Sw and sp are the corresponding marginal 
(and average) propensities to save, and Sw < sp. Total savings 
are given by 
S = 
or substituting for W from (S.I), 
S = sw(Y P) + spP 
= (sp - sw)P + swY 
Oi viding (S .4') by Y gives 
SlY = s = (sp - sw)(P/Y) + Sw 
(S.1 ) 
(S.2) 
(S.3) 
(S.4 ) 
(S.4' ) 
(S. S) 
Equation (5.5) states that the savings propensity for the 
economy as a whole, s, is a positive function of the share of 
profit in the national income, PlY. 
The latter relationship is particularly relevant to the 
factor-proportions problem discussed in Chapter 2. Recall 
that the growth rate of output for the economy characterized 
by fixed factor proportions, is given by 
where k and f are the growth rates of capital and labour 
employment,respectively. Similarly, 
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(5.6 ) 
k = sa (5.7) 
where a is the constant output/capital ratio. Substituting 
(5.5) into (5.7) gives 
which states that the growth rate of capital, and hence the 
growth rates of output and labour employment, are directly 
related to the share of profit in the national income. 
Suppose now that the growth rate of labour unemployment 
i s given by u = fa - f, where fa is the (constant) growth rate 
of the labour supply, and f a > f. According to equation (5.7'), 
it would be possible to eliminate such unemployment by raising 
the level of aggregate savings via a redistribution of income 
in favour of the capitalists; specifically, the increase in 
s should be such as to raise both k and f by the proportion u, 
(5.7') 
so that k' = £' = £a where k' = k + U and £' = £ + u. 
Conversely, a redistribution of income in favour of workers 
would ,reduce the growth rates of capital and labour employment, 
and if the labour supply grew at a constant rate, the net 
effect would then be an increase in the level of labour 
unemployment. 
The above analysis suggests that a conflict may exist 
between the objective of a high growth rate of output on the 
one hand, and that of an equitable distribution of income on 
the other. The extent of this conflict will, of course, depend 
on whether the propensity to save varies significantly between 
different income groups within the economy, and/or whether 
aggregate savings do indeed contribute markedly to the growth 
of output. Generally, if the savings propensity of the rich 
exceeded that of the poor, a policy of income redistribution 
in favour of the poor would ceteris paribus cause a decrease 
in the aggregate savings level, and hence also in the growth 
rates of capital, output and employment. 
There are good reasons why the latter conclusion should 
be treated with caution. It fails to recognize that people 
earning high incomes may use their savings for investment 
purposes in other countries;14 or alternatively, that private 
domestic investment may not account for all or even most of the 
secular groth of income. 15 Moreover, the analysis is based on 
14. See ILO (1970). 
15. See Meier (1976, pp. 258-261). 
145. 
a given state of technology which may well be subject to 
change over time: there is enough evidence indicating · that 
the labour content of production can be increased substantially 
by the use of more appropriate productio·n techniques .16 Never-
theless, even if a redistribution of income in favour of the 
poor did cause a decrease in the growth of output, the policy 
might still be deemed desirable from a social welfare point of 
view: " .... it is worth sacrificing production to reduce this 
evil (of unemployment)".17 
16. See, for example, Pack (1976). 
17. Stewart and Streeten (1973, p. 372). 
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147. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the chief objectives of this thesis was to investigate 
whether 'conventional' economic theory - specifically the neo-
classical theory of general equilibrium - is sufficiently flexible 
to accarm:xlate the particular conditions prevailing in the developing 
countries. Most existing theories of economic underdevelopment adopt 
an analytical approach which in effect amounts to relaxing some 
of the basic assumptions of the neoclassical theory. When applied 
to the two-sector model of general equilibrium, these theories 
generally yield predictions which are vastly different from those 
associated with the standard neoclassical assumptions of perfect 
competition, unlimited factor substitutability and unrestricted 
resource mobility. 
Several theories attempt to explain the development problem 
in terms of the specific production processes used in developing 
countries. Myrdal's (1957) theory of cumulative causation, for 
example, effectively introduces increasing returns to scale in 
at least one sector or region of the economy; in constrast to 
the neoclassical theory, he thus envisages a cumulative process 
of regional divergence in the income level per worker. Similarly, 
Richard Eckaus's (1955) explanation of the "factor-proportions 
problem" is based on the assumption of I imited factor substitut-
ability . This enables him to establish the existence of a so-
called "unemployment equilibrium" , th us implying that developing 
countries may be faced with a conflict between the objective of 
maximizing social welfare on the one hand, and that of full 
employment on the other. More recently, Leibenstein (1960) 
has shown how this trade-off could be complicated by the 
introduction of labour-saving technological inventions and 
innovations. The solution to the factor-proportions problem 
generally consists in the adoption of more appropriate, usually 
labour-biased technologies, increased capital formation and a 
reduction in the growth rate of the labour supply. 
Much of the postwar literature on economic development 
centres on the imperfectly competitive structure of the product 
and the factor markets in developing countries. Myint (1954) 
has highlighted the role played by monopolies and oligopolies 
during the so-called "opening-up" process of economic develop-
ment. Likewise, both Lewis's (1954) dualist theory and Todaro's 
(1969; 1971) model of rural-urban migration attempt to explain 
the unemployment problem in terms of various factor price 
distortions. Prebisch (1959) and Singer (1950) have again 
shown how prevailing differences in the structure of markets 
between the developed and developing countries might turn the 
international terms of trade against the latter; using a two-
sector model, Bhagwati (1958) has demonstrated that such a 
deterioration in the terms of trade could bring about a net 
decrease in the welfare level of the countries concerned . 
Generally , the policy measures . relevant to the "market 
imperfections" problem include the creat ion of job opportunities 
in the rural (rather than urban) sector , the encouragement of 
informal-sector enterprises , and the imposition of appropriate 
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factor taxes and subsidies as a means of counteracting the 
adverse effect on employment of factor price distortions. 
A more recent approach to the unemployment problem is the 
plea by the International Labor Office (1972) for a redistribu-
tion of income within the developing countries. In terms of the 
two-sector model, such a polciy may well succeed in eliminating 
labour unemployment caused by fixed factor proportions and/or 
factor price distortions. It should be realized, though, that 
a redistribution of income might also reduce the aggregate 
savings level, and hence the growth rates of capital and 
labour employment in the economy. 
On the whole, it would seem that these theories do indeed 
adopt a modified version of the neoclassical theory in providing 
a fairly comprehensive explanation of the economic problems of 
labour unemployment, low incomes and inequality; that is, the 
theories generally seek to explain the development problem in 
terms of the operation of the input and output markets, as well 
as in relation to the production process itself. However, a 
potentially damaging criti cism would be that mo st of these 
theories are too narrowly based on the so-called "economic" 
determinants of the problem. 1 This raises the question 
whether particular environmental influences, social institutions 
and individual attitudes are sufficient to render the assumption 
of "optimizing behaviour" largely inappropriate within the 
context of the develop ing nations. 2 While the evidence on 
this is far f rom conclusive , there does seem to ge a growing 
1. See, for example, Myrdal (1968, 1973) and Seers (1963). 
2 . See Boeke (195 3 ). 
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consensus among development economists at least, that the 
majority of people in developing·countries do respond positively 
to a wide range of market incentives. 3 It is indeed worth 
quoting Baldwin's (1972) optimistic view on this matter: "Since 
economic development via reliance upon the price system is the 
most inexpensive way for governments to carry out their develop-
ment commitments, the mass of evidence indicating that most 
people respond favourably to economic incentives is a very 
hopeful sign". 
Mainstream development economists do not, of course, deny 
that some "non-economic" variables may play an important role 
in restraining individual responses to market signals. 4 What 
is being questioned increasingly, however, is the feasibility 
of systematically treating these "non-economic" variables in 
such a way that they may be incorporated into an explanatory 
model of the development problem. Indeed, the literature seems 
to suggest that such a procedure is either not possible at the 
present time, or that it could only be adopted at the risk of 
destroying the operational value of the model(s) concerned. 
Of course, the meaningful coexistence of 'theory' and 
'practice' should not require a denial of their respective 
essential and distinctive features. A tolerant attitude 
towards such a compromise was adopted by a recent review of 
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3. See, for example, Neumark (1958), Elkan (1960), Lipton (1968) 
and Baldwin (1972). 
4. See Higgens (1956), Hoselitz (1957), McClelland (1961) and 
Hagen (1964). 
Sir John Hicks' 'Collected Essays in Economic Theory': 
". . • .• Sir John shows that it is pretty we II 
impossible for practice ever to be more than 
a kind of make-do and mend. However, there 
is little pOint in rejecting the real world 
because it is not the ideal world of an 
abstract theoretical system (although that 
is precisely what some economists have done). 
Instead, it is necessary to make sense of the 
real world, but to retain the intellectual 
standards of the theoretical one - as Sir 
John always does".5 
5. The Economist, 10 October, 1981: 
Wealth and Welfare: Collected Essays 
1981, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Review of Hicks, J.R., 
in Economic Theor~, Vol. 1, 
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APPENDIX 1: The Social Welfare Function. 
The presumed existence of a social welfare function implies 
the following important suppositions: 
(i) The welfare of society depends only on the welfare of 
the individuals comprising that society; that is, 
(A 1.1 ) 
where W represents the level of social welfare, and U
a 
and Ub 
are the utility levels of individuals A and B respectively. 
(ii)(a) The social welfare function presupposes an ethicaJ 
valuation of the relative deservingness or worthiness of the 
individuals concerned. 1 Consider, for example,the following 
social or community indifference curve, 
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(A1.2) 
Its rate of change, 
(aw/aUa) dUa + (aw/aUb) dUb = 0 (Al.3) 
or dUa/dU b 
aw/au b (A1.3' ) = 
aw/au
a 
reflects society's reLative preference for the welfare of the two 
individuals : that is, (dUa/dUb) depends on the relative contribu-
tions assumed to be made by the respective individual utilities to 
the level of social welfare . 
1. Irrespective, that is, of whether such a valuation is made 
democratically or dictatod_alJ.y, and whether or not it is 
"non- controversial" . (See Nath (1973, pp. 20-21) and Arrow (1951) ). 
(ii)(b) The above value judgement is embodied in what is 
sometimes referred to · as the Bergson welfare criterion. 2 This 
criterion encompasses, or "is more complete than",3 the so-called 
Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, SCitovsky and· other welfare criteria. 4 
Specifically, although the Bergson welfare criterion is consistent 
with the Pareto criterion - for example, social welfare will 
improve Geteris paribus if the utility level of at least one 
individual increases; or (aw/aU
a
) > 0 it is nevertheless 
compatible also with the possibility of a welfare improvement 
arising from an increase in the utility level of one individual 
at the expense of that of the other. 
(iii) The individual (or head of household) is the sole 
5 (and best possible) judge of his own welfare; or 
and 
Ua = Ua (O~, O~) 
Ub = Ub (O~, O~) 
(A 1.4) 
(A1.5) 
a a b b 
where Ox' Oy and Ox' Oy are the quantities of X and Y consumed by 
A and B respectively. 
Let us now extend the analysis somewhat, by substituting (A1 .4 ) 
and (A1.S) into (A1.1): 
153. 
w = W r;; (Oa La x (A1.1') 
2. Bergson (1937-38), Baumol (1965, p . 167) refers to Bergson's 
criterion as lithe social value judgement par excellence tl • 
3 . Ibid., p. 1 68 . 
4. See Kaldor (1939) , Hicks (1939), Sitovsky (194 1-42) and Little (1957). 
5 . This implies in effect "complete consumer and producer sovereignty" 
(Nath, 1969. p.9). 
But since, 
and 
where Qx and Qy 
then, using the 
and 
Qx = Qa + Qb x x 
Qy = Qa + Qb Y Y 
are the total quantities 
"function of a function" 
W = V (Qx' Qy) 
Wo = V (Qx' Qy) 
(A 1.6) 
(A 1 .7) 
of X and Y respectively; 
rule,6 
(A1.1") 
(A1 .8) 
where (A1.1") represents the social welfare function in commodity 
space, and (A1.8) is one of the (infinite number of) corresponding 
community indifference curves . Two such community indifference 
curves are shown in Figure A1.1, where it is assumed that output 
ratios along the curve labelled W2 all yield a higher level of 
social welfare than those given by Wr 
Each of the curves in Figure A1 . 1 may be viewed as one of a 
set of non- intersecting Sc i tovsky commun i ty ind i fference curves,l 
. provided it is assumed that individual tastes and/or marginal 
propensities to consume are identical.8 Should such an assumption 
seem unnecessarily far-fetched, then an alternative interpretation 
is provided in the form of the so-called Bergsen welfare frontier. 9 
6. A similar procedure is followed by Winc h (1971, p . 50). 
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7. Their derivation is illustrated in Mishan (1960) and Bilas (1972, ch.12). 
8 . See Gorman (1953) and Nath (1969, p.27). 
9. This was introduced in the literature by Samuelson (1956) and Graaff 
(1 95 7 , ch. 3 ) . 
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A Bergson frontier represents the inner limit of a set of inter secting 
Scitovsky indifference curves, each of which is associated with 
given levels of individual utility, and all of which correspond to a 
particular level of social welfare: in short, each pOint along the 
Bergson frontier represents the maximum attainable welfare limit, on 
the assumption that the goods are optimally produced and distributed 
among the members of soc iety. Since Bergson frontiers cannot 
intersect in the absence of externalities,10 they represent in 
effect a set of Pareto-comparable community indifference curves 
in output space. 
10 . See Gr aaff (1 957 , ch .3 ) 
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APPENDIX 2: Welfare Maximization and Pareto Optimality. 
Consider the following Lagrangian expression, 
G = 
(A2.1 ) 
where the variables are defined as in the text, and Px' Py ' rand w 
are Lagrange multipliers representing the prices of X, Y, K and L 
respectively. Maximization of (A2.1 ) impl ies that: 
oG/oQ~ = (oW/oUa) (oU/oQ~) - Px = 0 (A2.2) 
oG/oQ~ = (oW/oU a) ( oUa/oQ~) - Py = 0 (A2.3) 
oG/oQ~ = (oW/oU b) ( oUb/oQ~) - Px = 0 (A2.4) 
oG/oQ~ = (oW/oU b) ( oUb/oQ~) Py = 0 (A2.5) 
oG/oKx = P (oQ/oKx) x + r = 0 (A2.6) 
oG/oL
x = Px (oQx/oLx) + w = 0 (A2.7) 
oG/oKy = Py ( oQ/oKy) + r = 0 (A2.8) 
oG/oLy = Py (oQ/oLy) + w = 0 (A2.9) 
The results in the text are obtained as follows: 
(i) Rearranging equations (A2.6) through (A2.9) and dividing 
(A2.7) by (A2.6) and (A2.9) by (A2.8), we get : 
a Ox/a Lx 
w/r 
a Q/o Ly (A2.10) 
= = 
~x/iJ/..x ~/iJ/..y 
(ii) Rearranging equations (A2.2) through (A2.5) and dividing 
(A.2.2) by (A2.3) and (A2.4) by (A2.5), give : 
aU laQa aUbl aQ~ (A2.11) a x P/Py = 
aU I aQa aUb/aQ~ a y 
(i i i) Next, rearranging (A2.6) and (A2 .8) gives: 
P
x (aQ I aK ) = P Y (aQ/aKy) (A2.12) x x 
or 
15B. 
= (A2. 12 ' ) 
The total differentials of the two production functions are: 
(A2.13) 
(A2.13') 
and simi larly, 
= 
[ 
aQ l aL (aQ I aK ) d K 1 + x x 
x x x aQ laK 
x x 
(A2 . 14 ) 
But since dK
x 
= -dKy and dLx = -dLy under perfect competition, 
it follows from (A2 . 10) that the second bracketed term of (A2.13') 
is equal to that of (A2.14); accordingly, dividing (A2.13') by 
(A2.14) we get: 
(A2.15 ) 
Combining (A2.12') and (A2.15) gives: 
= 
and similarly, combining (A2.11) and (A2.16): 
au /aQa 
a x 
au /aQa 
a y 
= 
aUb/6Q~ 
aUb/aQ~ 
Finally, from (A2.2) through (A2.5) we have: 
aw/aQ~ = Px = aw/aQb x 
and aw/aQ~ = Py = aw/aQ~ 
from which it follows that1 
Combining (A2.16), (A2.17) and (A2 .20) gi ves: 
aW/aQx aUa/aQ~ aUb/aQ~ 
dQ/dQx = = = 
aw/aQy aUa/aQ~ aU /iJQb b u 
(A2.16) 
(A2.17) 
(A2.18) 
(A2.19) 
(A2.20) 
(A2.21 ) 
representing all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
maximization of social welfare. 
See footnote 6 in Appendix 1 above. 
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APPENDIX 3: Factor Mobility and the Neoclassical Steady-State. 
The growth rate of the total or combined regional output is given 
by: 
q' = t (A3.1 ) 
where q~ and q; represent the regional growth rates of output 
under steady-state conditions; that is, 
q' y 
= 
= 
= 
n + 
n + 
Substituting (A3.3) into (A3.2) into (A3.1), and rearranging 
terms we ha ve, 
But since output per worker is assumed to be a constant 
proportionate function of the capital : labour ratio, or 
= 
* bK
x 
/ (1 - 01.) 
and = * fKy / (1 - 8) 
substitution of (A3.4) into (A3.1') gives: 
(A3.2) 
(A3 .3) 
(A3.4) 
qt = n + G(b<-fK;) (b</(1-0I.) fK;/(1-8)]/(Qx+ Qy) 
(A3.1") 
* * Accordingly, since bKx < fKy 3nd (1 - 01.) > (1 -8 ) by assumption, 
it follows that qf > n and (q~ - n» O. 
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